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Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts 
CHARLES F. ABERNATHY* 
We have long recognized that the resurrection of § 1983 converted the 
fourteenth amendment from a shield into a sword by providing a civil action 
for vindication of constitutional rights1 and, to the extent that damages have 
gradually become the authorized remedy for§ 1983 violations/ we have eas-
ily come to think of such actions as constitutional torts-civil damage reme-
dies for violations of constitutionally defined rights. 3 There is, however, a 
subtler and greater reality to what has transpired, for the mere procedural 
vehicle of constitutional enforcement has, in retrospect, changed the sub-
stance of constitutional law itself. Section 1983 has not merely served as a 
vehicle for enforcing constitutional law, it has led to the making of a new 
constitutional law as the Court has adjusted constitutional norms to permit 
their enforcement under § 1983. 
Courts have been slow to recognize this new reality because it appears 
inconsistent with the accepted lore about§ 1983, that it has no substance of 
its own, creates no rights, and merely enforces those rights already found in 
the Constitution.4 That remains true, courts having decisively rejected pro-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1969, J.D. 1973, LL.M. 1975 
Harvard University. I wish to thank my research assistants, Kathryn M. Silva and Lauren Van 
Wazer, and my colleagues who heard and criticized an earlier version of this paper, for their help in 
preparing this article. 
1. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 
277, 322 (1965) (using metaphor of sword and shield). 
2. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12 (1983) (no equitable relief shall be given 
in § 1983 case unless remedies at law are inadequate; damages are adequate remedy even against 
widely enforced government policy authorizing police to use chokeholds to subdue· suspects); Whit-
man, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 41-67 (1980) (criticizing developing emphasis on 
damage remedies under§ 1983 and offering alternative approach that was not cited, but was implic-
itly rejected in Lyons). 
3. For recent examples of the accepted lore of "constitutional torts," see Blum, Applying the 
Parratt/Hudson Doctrine, 13 HAsTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 695 passim (1986) (due process claims under 
§ 1983); Eisenberg & Scwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 
641 passim (1987) (statistical analysis of claims); Levinson, Due Process Challenges to Governmental 
Actions: The Meaning of Parratt and Hudson, 18 URB. LAW. 189 passim (1986) (due process 
claims under§ 1983); Note, Daniels, Davidson, and the Unleal'ned Lesson of Parratt v. Taylor: 
Eliminating Simple Negligence as a Basis for Procedural Due Process Claims (If at First You Don't 
Succeed, Overrule It), 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 98 passim (1986) (by L. Yustak) (liability stan-
dards); Note, Section 1983 and Due Process Liberties, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 129 passim (1986) 
(due process liability); Note, A Theory of Negligence for Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE L.J. 683 
passim (1983) (by R. Kania) [hereinafter Note, A Theory of Negligence] (arguing for negligence 
standard for supervisory liability); cf. Casto, Government Liability for Constitutional Torts: Propos-
als to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 201 passim (1982) (federal govern-
ment's liability). 
4. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing cases confirming Court's view that 
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fessorial suggestions that statutory liability should be tied to the common law 
of 1871 or to some notion of evolving federal common law.5 The constitu· 
tional law that is read into § 1983 is, however, not static, and one of the 
factors that has affected the development of constitutional law is § 1983 liti· 
gation. The primary effect has been the expression of constitutional law in 
tort-like phrases, a substantial departure from the structural constitutional 
law emphasized by the Warren and Burger Courts.6 
The definition of standards of care for § 1983's constitutional torts, some· 
times incompletely labeled as state-of-mind requirements, is the primary area 
in which this new development has occurred. 7 The original Supreme Court 
decision reinvigorating § 1983, Monroe v. Pape, 8 signaled that this would be 
an important topic, but the Monroe Court's perception that mental elements 
would be critical in distinguishing civil from criminal violations9 proved in· 
sufficiently insightful, for choice of state-of-mind requirements even more 
greatly implicates traditional concerns about federalism and the proper rela· 
tionship between federal and state courts. 10 The very availability of damage 
§ 1983 creates no substantive rights). Section 1983 also enforces some rights found in other federal 
statutes. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 107 S. Ct. 766, 770-74 (1987) 
(rights under federal housing act enforceable under "and laws" language of§ 1983 because no evi-
dent congressional intent to preclude remedy). This non-constitutional aspect of§ 1983 is not dis-
cussed in this Article. 
5. See infra note 57 (discussing problems raised by resort to state law). Professors Eisenberg and 
Kreimer have previously offered these theses, finding the rationale for looking to common law in 
§ 1983's companion statute, § 1988. See Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The 
Proper Scope ofSectlon 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 528 (1980) (section 1988 should be viewed in 
its historical context when interpreting congressional intent); Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil 
Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 630 (1985)(federal courts 
should establish common law of civil rights actions under§ 1988). 
6. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing predominant method of constitutional 
adjudication-the balancing of individual rights against state interests as expressed by legislative 
intent). 
7. See Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The State-of-Mind Re-
quirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 45, 53-70 (1977) (discussing various mental elements that might be 
read into § 1983); Comment, The Evolution of the State of Mind Requirement of Section 1983, 47 
TuL. L. REv. 870, 883-86 (1973) (by R. Landholm) (reviewing three mental elements that could be 
adopted). See generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 
5, 13-25 (1974) (discussing connection between § 1983 and tort concepts generally). Professor 
Nahmod had by the 1980s become-the foremost advocate of discussing § 1983 in tort terms. SeeS. 
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 124-28, 
175-85, 250-58 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing issues by use of tort language). But, in his most recent 
work, Nahmod suggests that overuse of tort language demeans the constitutional interests enforced 
through § 1983. See Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 
GEO. L.J. 1719, 1720 (1989) (tort rhetoric makes § 1983 less protective of fourteenth amendment 
rights and results in more claims being sent to state courts). 
8. 365 u.s. 167 (1961). 
9. See id. at 187 (distinguishing § 242's criminal provision, which contains an explicit "wilfull-
ness" requirement, from § 1983's civil standard). 
10. See Brower v. Inyo County, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1381 (1989) (distinguishing between concerns 
implicated by constitutional law and those implicated by state tort law and using intent requirement 
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remedies and intrusive injunctions under§ 1983 heightened these traditional 
concerns, 11 and the post-Monroe prospect of wholesale creation of new state-
of-mind requirements for § 1983 transformed concern to anxiety, especially 
as some courts indicated that the requirements should be developed by incor-
porating ordinary common-law tort standards into federallaw. 12 
The movement for direct incorporation of state tort elements into § 1983 
soon came to a halt, not only because of increasing appreciation of the feder-
alism concerns, 13 but also because of basic manageability problems with the 
to distance the two concerns from one another). Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01 
(1976) (federal courts should avoid reading state tort standards into § 1983 so as not to upset 
federal system that places states in control of most torts) with The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873) (fourteenth amendment should not be so broadly construed as to inaugu-
rate "[radical) changes [in] the whole theory of the relations of the state and federal governments"). 
11. Professor Nichol has argued that § 1983 "was designed to afford an extremely intrusive fed-
eral remedy." Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 13 VA. L. REV. 959, 963 (1987) 
(making the argument particularly with respect to state judges, but then suggesting that changed 
times make it necessary to depart from strict adherence to the framers' vision). The Supreme Court 
has tended to limit§ 1983's intrusiveness. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1976) (limit-
ing broad-ranging structural decrees in context of police-misconduct case); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (federalism concerns inherent in eleventh amendment prevent use of§ 1983 to 
obtain retroactive monetary awards against state treasuries); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 
(1971) ("our federalism" prevents federal court in§ 1983 action from enjoining pending state crimi-
nal prosecution). Congress has also adopted some limited legislation that has made it more difficult 
for federal courts to intrude. See Civil Rights oflnstitutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) 
(1982) (requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies in some cases). But see Hutto v. Fin-
ney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978) (Congress meant to make state governments liable for attorneys' fees 
in some § 1983 cases). Commentators have also urged restrictions of§ 1983 in the interests of 
federalism. See Whitman, supra note 2, at 62-67 (suggesting that Court limit damage recoveries and 
accentuate equitable relief, a position rejected by the Court in Lyons); Developments in the Law-
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1185-88 (1977) (displaying concern that Jaw 
made under § 1983 might displace states' roles and examining techniques developed to inhibit such 
developments). 
12. See infra Part III.A (discussing problem of disembodied state of mind requirements). 
13. Increasing concern that the problem Jay in§ 1983 as a statute manifested itself in a variety of 
ways: (1) creation of defenses that limit damage relief but not all liability, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 
U.S. 522, 541-44 (1984) (immunity defenses do not bar attorneys fees awards or declaratory and 
injunctive relief in§ 1983 cases); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) Gudicial immunity is 
available defense to section 1983 claim); (2) narrow construction of ancillary relief, such as attor-
neys' fees, so that constitutional rights may remain vindicated but the hicentive to use§ 1983 as the 
vehicle for vindication will be reduced, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-60 (1987) (no attor-
neys' fee award when plaintiff has won favorable ruling of Jaw unless plaintiff also ultimately secures 
civil relief); and (3) creation of special interpretations, although sometimes abortive, that try to 
make the scope of§ 1983 narrower than constitutional law, compare Polk County v. Dodson, 454 
U.S. 312, 317-25 (1981) (public defenders not acting "under color of" Jaw, with strong implication 
that statutory language may be narrower than constitutional state-action doctrine) with Tower v. 
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984) (public defender may be sued for conspiring with state officials to 
deprive another of federal right) and West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988) (statutory "under 
color of" Jaw element is coterminous with constitutional state-action doctrine). Yet it is difficult to 
make the argument that these concerns have eviscerated the statute or hampered the enforcement of 
constitutional law through § 1983. See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2308 (1988) (restrictive 
state notice-of-claim provision cannot be applied to § 1983 action even when it is brought in state 
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concept itself.14 However, the language of torts continued in use, the Court 
explaining that the state-of-mind requirements it was adopting had grown 
from constitutional law rather than state tort law, and that the particular 
requirement in any given § 1983 case would turn on what right the plaintiff 
sought to enforce. 15 Part I of this Article traces this development. 
The Court's recognition that it was creating§ 1983's standards from con-
stitutional law came a full twenty-five years after Monroe-and after it al-
ready had accreted a sizeable number of cases constructing such mental 
elements without the benefit of an e~planatory theory. 16 These cases, more-
over, differ strikingly from the predominant constitutional law of the period, 
because they concentrate on dispositive individual states-of-mind rather than 
strict scrutiny, ends/means tests, and the other structured approaches tradi-
tionally associated with modern constitutionallaw.t? Part II of this Article 
explains why§ 1983 has affected constitutional lawmaking in this way. The 
responsible factors are largely a function of two profound policy choices-
personal liability of officials regardless of the legality of their actions under 
state law and the practical need to instruct juries. 
Part III discusses a derivative but nevertheless equally important matter, 
the problem of discussing state-of-mind requirements alone without specify-
ing full standards of care that designate constitutional duties on which the 
state-of-mind elements should focus. These constitutional considerations 
must ultimately rein in tort phrases to provide a constitutionally based focus 
for the Court's state-of-mind requirements so that juries are not free to make 
their own constitutional law. 
The impact of these factors on constitutional law has not yet been fully 
appreciated by teachers of constitutional law, and few constitutional law 
casebooks deal with cases in this area. 18 There are some aspects of older 
court); Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 544 (1988) (adopting dissenting position of Judge Posner 
in court of appeals; statutory-based absolute immunity for judges restricted to their judicial func-
tions, not applicable to administrative duties); Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1895 (1988) (first 
amendment requires overturning state law that prohibits paying persons who gather signatures for 
initiative petition). See generally G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & V. TUSHNET, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 756-900 (1986) [hereinafter STONE & SEIDMAN] (noting fundamental rights created 
since mid-1960s). 
14. See infra note 48 and accompanying text (noting number of potential state law torts with 
which one constitutional violation might overlap). 
15. See infra Part l.c.2 (discussing Court's decisions in 1986). At least one student author has 
seen creative potential in constructing constitutional rather than common-law standards of care for 
§ 1983. See Note, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 3, at 687 (arguing that constitutional norms 
should, more than under common law, lead to increased findings of municipal liability). 
16. See infra note 115 (cataloguing such cases). 
17. See infra Section II.B.l.a (discussing state of mind requirements and comparing them to 
structured constitutional law). 
18. The major· exception is Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1987), which applies the intent test to equal protection violations. Jd. at 265. 
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unstructured constitutional law that share some of the concerns with individ-
uation that are seen in this area of constitutional law, 19 and therefore it is 
difficult to make the claim that this is an entirely new constitutional phenom-
enon. Nevertheless, the developments in this area have had such an ex-
traordinary impact on the lower federal courts, where constitutional torts 
dominate the civil caseload of constitutional cases, that perhaps it is time for 
us to consider constitutional torts as more than a procedure for enforcing 
constitutional law, and instead as the next step beyond separation of powers 
(Constitutional Law I) and structured protection of individual rights (Consti-
tutional Law II)-to consider it Constitutional Law III, the new constitu-
tional standards of care influenced by § 1983. 
l. SECTION 1983 AND THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS OF CARE 
A. MONROE V. PAPE AND THE LEGACY OF "DUAL COVERAGE" 
When Chicago police officers in Monroe v. Pape 20 faced a § 1983 com-
plaint that they had broken into a house, ransacked its contents, searched the 
family naked, held the father without charge, and subsequently released him 
without apology,21 they proposed a simple defense: their acts were not done 
"under color of" law as required by§ 1983 because they were in violation of 
state law.22 Thus, they argued, the plaintiff's appropriate remedy was to file 
a state-law claim in state court.23 It was the Court's rejection of this Brer 
Rabbit defense24 that created the modem § 1983 suit for constitutional 
torts.25 
But even here most case books place the case in the context of structured review under equal protec-
tion. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 698 (11th ed. 1985) (placing intent in context 
of high-level scrutiny and using it as transition to affirmative action issues); W. LOCKHART, Y. 
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1288 (5th ed. 1980) (discussing intent in context 
of high-level scrutiny given to race); STONE & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 553 (indicating that 
intentional racial discrimination receives high-level scrutiny but unintended version receives low-
level scrutiny); cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 824, 1504, 1512 (2d ed. 1988) 
(repeatedly discussing Arlington Heights in institutional terms-e.g., as disguising a remedies issue 
or reflecting "institutional concerns"). 
19. See infra Part II.B. I.e (discussing "definitional balancing" cases). 
20. 365 u.s. 167 (1961). 
21. Id. at 169. 
22. Id. at 172. 
23. /d.; cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
390-91 (1971) (when faced with prospect of constitutional tort action being created against them, 
federal officials also argue for reliance upon existing state-law remedies, albeit with removal of the 
claims to federal court). 
24. See J. HARRIS, How Mr. Rabbit Was Too Sharp for Mr. Fox, in THE COMPLETE TALES OF 
UNCLE REMUS 12-14 (1972). Brer Rabbit, like the defendants in Monroe, assured the fox that 
throwing him into the briar patch would be a painful punishment, although, of course, it actually 
placed Brer Rabbit on his home ground whe~;e he could escape the fox. 
25. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 323-24 (inaugurating phrase "constitutional tort" to describe 
claims allowed under Monroe). A predecessor decision under the criminal counterpart to § 1983, 
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Prior to Monroe, it had been possible to file § 1983 suits in federal court 
challenging the constitutionality of state legislation or other official policy, 26 
but lower courts had rarely permitted § 1983-based attacks against official 
misconduct violating state law.27 Indeed, a set of judicially created principles 
had directed to state court many cases that alleged violations of both state 
and federallaw.28 When Monroe permitted such claims to be brought under 
§ 1983,29 it created a "dual-coverage" statute,30 one that plaintiffs could use 
not only to attack the constitutionality of statutes and official policy but also 
to attack action by officials that simultaneously violated state statutes or offi-
cial state policies and the Constitution. 
The tort-like aspects that this expansion introduced into§ 1983 were rein-
forced by another part of the Monroe holding, that part that exempted local 
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1945) (interpreting present-day § 242 of the criminal 
code, which also contains the phrase "under color of" law, to cover state official's action in viola-
tion of state law), had led to several lower court decisions favoring the expansion of§ 1983. Shapo, 
supra, at 287-94. Monroe, however, constituted the Supreme Court's first modern re-reading of the 
statute. 
Professor Shapo's article not only provides a first analysis of Monroe, but is also an historical 
artifact in its own right. Given his sensitive discussion of the cases and the sense of justice that he 
saw behind the decision, one must take his criticism of the developments as a striking indication of 
the substantial change that Monroe initiated. See id. at 322 ("it seems questionable that a breach of 
[all the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights] must in all cases call forth the response of this 
statutory sword"); id. at 324 ("A cogent argument could be made that the punishment of police 
offenses clearly is reserved to the states."); and id. at 326-27 ("fears [of federal intrusion into local 
affairs] must count for something," for Monroe developed "a variety of federal common law without 
a correspondingly compelling federal interest" (footnotes omitted)). The creator of the phrase 
"constitutional tort," it seems, was also its first critic. 
26. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (attack by union members on ordi-
nances prohibiting certain public meetings); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (attack by 
blacks on Texas' voting statutes prohibiting their participation in Democratic party primary elec-
tions); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1915) (attack by blacks against state's statutory 
grandfather clause for voting). For a discussion of the general constitutional decisionmaking pro-
cess prior to Monroe, which was also charaterized by a predominant focus on statutes, see infra text 
accompanying notes 171-79 (discussing old structured constitutional law). 
27. See Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237, 240 (7th Cir. 1959) (holding that acts in violation of state 
law fall outside § 1983). The few decisions that had begun to permit such suits came only after 
1945, the year in which the Supreme Court interpreted the criminal law counterpart of§ 1983 to 
cover acts done in violation of state law, see supra note 25 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 
91 (1945), which interprets§ 1983's criminal counterpart to cover Monroe-type situation), and thus 
they were in effect only experimental anticipations of Monroe itself. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 287-
94 (discussing pre-Monroe § 1983 cases that addressed both physical and economic harms). 
28. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) (abstention doctrine requir-
ing plaintiff to submit unsettled state claims to state courts); Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 
U.S. 440, 455 (1916) (within power of state to require exhaustion of remedies available through 
state administrative agencies); Prentis v. Atlantic C.L. Co., 211 U.S. 210, 232 (1908) (requiring 
state-court exhaustion in state legislative rulemaking cases). 
29. 365 U.S. at 183 ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter 
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."). 
30. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text (discussing dual coverage of§ 1983 as inter-
preted in Monroe). 
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governments from paying the damage judgments that flow from§ 1983 ac-
tions.31 Combined with the long-established sovereign immunity doctrine, 
which protected state-level governments from monetary liability,32 Monroe 
created a regime in which constitutional enforcement (or restitution) would 
depend upon holding individuals responsible. 33 Thus, constitutional adjudi-
cation under§ 1983 not only covered officials who acted outside their state-
law authority, it also framed both dual-coverage topics in terms of individual 
responsibility. 34 
This transformation of§ 1983 into a tort-like statute would later generate 
an even more fundamental discussion, phrased in terms straight from the 
vocabulary of torts, about the standards of care imposed on state officials by 
§ 1983.35 Monroe had a bit to say about that topic as well, though it is doubt-
ful that the Court understood the full ramifications of its observations. 
When Justice Douglas wrote in Monroe that§ 1983 "should be read against 
the background of tort liability that makes a [person] responsible for the nat-
ural consequences of llis actions,"36 he had a limited agenda in mind. He 
intended only to note that § 1983, unlike its criminal-law counterpart, did 
not contain a statutory "willfulness" requirement. 37 Even if the remark had 
31. 365 U.S. at 187-91, rev'd, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
32. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908) (under eleventh amendment, a federal suit may be 
brought against individual officer to enjoin constitutional violation, but not against state itself); 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (eleventh amendment bars federal suits against a state, 
whether brought by its own citizens or citizens of another state); cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
651, 663 (1974) (even when officer may be sued, no monetary relief against state treasury may be 
awarded by federal court). 
33. The Court would later develop the official immunity doctrine to protect officers from per-
sonal liability in some cases. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (recognizing absolute 
and qualified immunities, varying with officer's duties); P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 89-99 
(1983) (discussing absolute and qualified officer immunity). 
34. Even following reversal of the portion of the Monroe holding that exempts local governments 
from paying damages for its officials' wrongdoings, see supra note 31, the Court continued to frame 
even municipal liability in terms of individual wrongdoing, see City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 
U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (necessary predicate for finding of municipal liability is finding of individual 
constitutional violation by officer). But see City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205-06 
(1989) (liability for failure to train; issue discussed in terms of disembodied decision that Court 
ascribed to no particular city official). 
35. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976) (observing that "survivors of an innocent by-
stander mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government 
vehicle" would not have claim because § 1983's standards are not synonomous with state torts); 
Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 70 (ultimate liability depends upon state-of-mind issues raised by 
defenses as well as constitutional amendment at issue); Kreimer, supra note 5, at 619 (arguing that 
federal common law modeled on long-rejected doctrine of Swift v. Tyson should guide § 1983); 
Note, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 3 (1983) (arguing that negligence should be standard 
governing supervisory liability). 
36. 365 U.S. at 187. 
37. Justice Douglas' opinion had relied upon precedent interpreting "under color of" law in 
§ 1983's criminal counterpart. Id. at 187. Since the unrelated willfulness requirement had domi-
nated discussion in the cited precedent, see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (sharp 
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not led lower courts on a fool's errand, however, courts still would have been 
faced with the same important issue after Monroe-what state-of-mind, if 
any, would a plaintiff need to prove in order to establish a claim under this 
newly discovered constitutional tort? 
The issue was not exactly a riew one. Actually, the Court had faced many 
occasions in its creation of constitutional law when it discussed the r~levance 
of state-of-mind issues. It was usually with respect to motive or intent, and 
Justice Douglas must have been aware of the long-running debate about mo-
tive in both active and dormant commerce clause cases, 38 as well as in equal 
protection and due process litigation. 39 But in those cases the search for 
motive, when relevant, was usually for legislative motive.40 The issue that 
was to arise after Monroe was the relevance of the state-of-mind of individual 
governmental officials who allegedly had violated their own state's law as 
well as the Constitution. 
B. THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS: ABORTIVE EARLY APPROACHES 
AND THEIR RELICS 
When faced with this new situation, early courts resorted to two quite 
different solutions, one for due process cases and the other for equal-protec-
tion-based racial discrimination cases. In due process cases, courts sought 
refuge in the law that had previously dealt with similar problems of individ-
ual responsibility, the law of torts. The most widely emulated decision, 
voting split on willfulness issue), Douglas was apparently signaling that persons reading the prece-
dent should not let its unrelated discussion affect their interpretation of§ 1983. See Mo11roe, 365 
U.S. at 187 (single paragraph referring to tort background and distinguishing Screws' state-of-mind 
requirement appears at end of four-page discussion of Screws' holding regarding "under color of" 
law). 
38. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 530-31 (1949) (denying license for 
"avowed purpose" of closing state market is unconstitutional); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100, 115 (1941) (rejecting inquiry into congressional motive); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 
315 (1925) (state regulation violates commerce clause when its "primary purpose .•. is prohibition 
of competition"); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) ("a court must be blind not 
to see" Congress' "regulatory affect and purpose"); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 
(1918) ("[w]e have neither the power nor disposition to question the motives of Congress"). 
39. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elec., 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (absent 
proof of intent to discriminate racially, literacy test for voting is constitutional); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (under rational basis review for due process and equal 
protection, Court will hypothesize state ends) (per Douglas, J.); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 
(1953) (fexas' election process purposely created to accomplish discrimination); Patton v. Missis-
sippi, 332 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1947) (intentional discrimination in jury selection unconstitutional). 
40. The best-known exception, conspicuous by its rarity, is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
373 (1886) (facially neutral ordinance, administered intentionally to exclude Chinese, is unconstitu-
tional). Since racial discrimination was perfectly constitutional in many areas of public life prior to 
1954, see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (reversing prior Court ruling that 
had permitted racial segregation of public schools under "separate but equal" doctrine), it should 
not be surprising that there are few cases in the early 20th century that search for racially discrimi-
natory motives. 
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Whirl v. Kern, 41 came from the Fifth Circuit and involved a sheriff "accused 
of wrongfully overextending to an inmate of his jail the hospitality of his 
hostelry and the pleasure of his cuisine."42 Upon being released, the inmate 
sued the jailor under § 1983, claiming that he had been deprived of his lib-
erty without due process of law. Faced with a defense argument that these 
things happen and no ill will was intended, 43 the court held that the state-of-
mind requirement in any given § 1983 case should be determined by analo-
gizing the wrong to its most similar state-law tort: 
Under well established principles of tort law, when an essential element of 
the wrong itself includes the demonstration of an improper motive, as iii 
malicious prosecution, then such principle becomes a part of sec. 1983. 
But the origin of such a requirement is in the common law of torts, not in 
the [1871] Civil Rights Act.44 
Whirl's incorporation of state tort law standards of care into§ 1983 led it 
to hold, on the facts before it, that virtual strict liability applied to such false 
imprisonment situations.45 Other courts adopted the Fifth Circuit's state-
tort-analogy approach in a number of other situations in which due process 
claims were at issue.46 Indeed, the thought process seemed so natural that 
virtually to this day courts, attorneys, and law professors often speak of the · 
§ 1983 cases before them as "false arrest," "malicious abuse of process," or 
"assault and battery" claims. 47 
As natural as it might have seemed, this idea of searching for state tort 
analogues was a cracked vase, one internally lit so as to disclose its defect. 
Its serious flaw was that it created the risk of forcing§ 1983 into a mold that 
completely overlapped with state tort law, rendering it--or the state law-
superfluous. This would have come about because constitutional principles 
at least superficially overlap with a host of state torts.48 Creation of a federal 
41. 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969). 
42. /d. at 785. 
43. /d. at 786. 
44. /d. at 787-88. 
45. /d. at 791. 
46. See infra notes 67-69 & 77 and accompanying text (discussing cases adopting Whirl v. Kern's 
approach in response to § 1983 due process claims). 
47. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 54 (listing possible § 1983 claims by reference to similar 
state-law torts); Kreimer, supra note 5, at 618-28 (arguing that use of general federal common law 
grown from old common law and supplemented by state law is precisely what Congress wanted for 
§ 1983). For a discussion of cases, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing§ 1983 
cases which refer to state tort law analogues). 
48. An illegal search under the fourth amendment might also comprise the state tort of trespass. 
See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390. Other possibilities include: an unconstitutional seizure and state-law 
battery or wrongful death; an unconstitutional uncompensated taking and state-law claim for in-
verse condemnation or common law taking; unconstitutional excessive use of force and state-law 
battery; procedural due process and state-law libel and contract claims. Cf. Owens v. Okure, 109 S. 
Ct. 573, 582 (1989) (when state has specific and general personal injury statutes, the statute of 
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tort law that might displace state law had been a constitutional taboo since at 
least the time of the Slaughter-House Cases, 49 a taboo reinforced by the di-
versity-law revolution of the 1930s,5° a taboo reiterated in a related context 
when the Supreme Court warned against creating statutory sources of federal 
tort law.51 
The internal light disclosing this flaw was evident in Whirl itself. When 
the court undertook the process of searching for tort analogues, it first looked 
broadly to decisions of courts around the country as well as to traditional 
sources of common law.52 Yet, at the dispositive moment in the case, it 
turned to the law of Texas, the state in which the claim arose. 53 If§ 1983 
were to adopt state law, was it to be the law of a particular state or the 
general common law? Rationales could be finessed to support either ap-
proach, but both seemed wildly improbable because of the results they pro-
duced. If the forum's law were adopted, federal rights under § 1983 would 
change as the state's law changed;54 if general state common law were 
adopted, federal rights would change as the mystic "majority rule" changed, 
a perverse form of national lawmaking. 55 These problems could be avoided 
by adopting the general common law of 1871, the year of § 1983's adop-
tion,56 but this approach-never considered in Whirl-would have tied 
limitations of the residual or general one applies in § 1983 action); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 
276 (1985) (in legal issue in which tort law is applied-statutes of limitation-Court lists possible 
analogues and finds list so extensive as to warrant conclusion t)lat all § 1983 claims should be 
analogized to generic "personal injury" actions). 
49. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,78 (1873) (newly adopted fourteenth amendment should not be read so 
as to "radically change" federalism and thereby allow central government to displace states' "ordi-
nary and fundamental" powers). 
50. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("[t]here is no federal general common 
law," and federal courts' pretense that there was violates Constitution). 
51. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1951) (conspiracy by private persons does 
not give rise to claim under § 1985(3); decision dictated by need to avoid constitutional problems 
inherent in creating federal torts in such situations). 
52. Whirl, 401 F.2d at 791-92 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2d, 
and state cases from Montana to New York). 
53. Id. at 791 & n.lO (since Texas law deems warrants '1unctus officio,'' jailor could rely on 
nothing to justify his holding of plaintiff and was therefore guilty of false imprisonment rather than 
false arrest). 
54. Cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (statute of limitation for§ 1983 determined 
by adoption of law of state in which the federal court sits and thus will vary from state to state). 
55. The deference to majority rules seen in the practice of defining appropriate official immuni-
ties relies 'upon the common law as it existed at the time of passage of§ 1983, and does not confer 
on the states the power of change. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (prosecutors 
receive absolute immunity under old common law). The sole suggestion that I have found of any 
delegation of collective decisionmaking to state common law is the argument that the right to jury 
trial "at common law" may have been intended to have a changing meaning over time. See Wolf-
ram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 639, 744-45 (1973) 
("the term 'common law' in the seventh amendment was probably intended to refer to a process of 
legal development, rather than to an immutable and changeless state of the law"). 
56. Cf. supra note 33 (discussing official immunity doctrine, which uses this approach). 
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§ 1983 to hundred-year-old notions, itself an unlikely option. 57 
To note this illuminated flaw in Whirl's analysis is not to take a pro:-plain-
tiff or pro-government position, as demonstrated by the cases that followed 
the Fifth Circuit's approach. It is true that plaintiffs were helped in the sense 
that state tort standards, developed largely with private relationships in 
mind, usually omitted the separate consideration of any independent state 
interests that might have changed the public policy balance and altered the 
state-of-mind element deemed appropriate for the§ 1983 suit. Moreover, to 
the extent that the approach simply referred to the law of torts, it focused on 
law more easily made by courts because it could be made as common law, 
without the constraints that accompanied the interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. 58 Yet the incorporation of sta~e law also shortchanged those favoring 
federal protection of human rights by simultaneously limiting constitutional 
commands under § 1983 to state-law levels and by turning decisionmaking 
authority over to the states. 59 
In § 1983 cases presenting race-based equal protection claims, courts did 
not tum to state law as a source for finding standards of care, probably be-
cause in the most active circuit there were no such analogues: states in the 
Fifth Circuit virtually required racial discrimination. 60 Therefore, it was not 
57. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 517 (1980) (tying § 1983 to old general common law would 
cause courts to use "rules of a different era to govern modern problems for which those rules will 
only fortuitously supply suitable answers"). Professor Kreimer has argued that the framers of 
§ 1983 did in fact intend to adopt the old common law, albeit the Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 
(1842), spurious federal version of that law. Kreimer, supra note 5, at 618-28. Yet even Professor 
Kreimer appears to contemplate that this federal common law would have continued to evolve, id. 
at 628, probably producing under the heading "common law" what the Court today calls constitu-
tional law. Most damaging to Professor Kreimer's thesis, however, is the Supreme Court's rejection 
of the statutory vehicle that would accomplish his result. Although one opinion pre-dating 
Kreimer's article suggests that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires resort to the general federal common law, 
see Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 n.5 (1978), later cases quite distinctly construe the 
statute to require selective adoption of state law, particularly the law of the state in which the 
district court sits. See Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573, 576 (1989) (section 1988 requires courts to 
adopt analogous state statute of limitation of forum); Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2307 (1988) 
(section 1988 normally requires resort to law of forum state); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 
(1985) (section 1983 requires use of forum's statute of limitations); ct Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2313-14 
(this choice-of-law problem should be analogized to Erie, not Swift). 
58. See Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987) (discussing techniques of constitutional decisionmaking and their rel-
ative importance). 
59. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985) (Tennessee law authorizing shooting of 
fleeing felon consistent with common law tradition but nevertheless unconstitutional), and Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940) (breach of peace under common law unconstitutional 
under free speech principles), which provide illustrative examples of the distinction between com-
mon law and constitutional norms. If common law dictated the content of constitutional torts, then 
by definition common law norms could not violate the Constitution or give rise to § 1983 actions. 
60. See generally J. PELTASON, FIFrY-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961) (chronicling experiences of 
federal judges who enforced desegregation decrees in southern states). 
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so much a matter of logic as one of necessity that forced the circuit court to 
an alternate source of law-the Constitution itself. In its en bane decision in 
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 61 the court faced a somewhat typical problem of 
the post-Brown era: a town had developed and provided municipal services 
to its white neighborhoods, but had done virtually nothing for its black 
neighborhoods. Local officials, of course, claimed that racism had not moti-
vated their decisions, that the visible divide in the town was the product of 
neutral decisionmaking or, at worst, mere inattentiveness. Rather than bas-
ing its opinion on readily available language in Monroe, 62 the court turned 
directly to constitutional norms, with the following conclusion: 
[Actual] intent, motive, or purpose to discriminate [need not be directly 
proved,] ... for " 'equal protection of the laws' means more than merely 
the absence of governmental action designed to discriminate; ... 'we now 
firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disas-
trous and unfair to private rights and to public interest as the perversity of 
a willful scheme.' "63 
The cases cited by the Hawkins court were of a similar nature. All in-
volved supposedly neutral decisions in social settings dominated by decades 
of entrenched segregation. 64 What is intriguing about these cases is that 
none, not even those presenting due process claims, invoked the language of 
Monroe. Rather, all developed the applicable law from available constitu-
tional sources, principally the two limited areas in which the Supreme Court 
had long rejected the separate-but-equal doctrine, voting and jury service. 65 
One other widely respected case from the period, not cited in Hawkins but 
relied on by other courts, developed the same principle from a combination 
of constitutional materials, chiefly those concerning legislative redistricting. 66 
61. 46i F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane), ajf'g 437 F.2d 1286 (1971). 
62. See Monroe, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (Congress intended§ 1983 to provide a remedy when 
"by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise, state laws might not be en-
forced" to protect citizens' rights). This statement, appearing in the middle of a discussion of legis-
lative history that contained lengthy quotations from the legislative debate, contained no citation to 
authority. Jd. · 
63. Hawkins, 461 F.2d. at 1172-73 (quoting Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 
F.2d. 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968)) (emphasis in Hawkins). 
64. See id. (citing Norwalk, 395 F.2d at 931) (bfacks displaced under urban renewal program and 
suffering long discrimination in private housing market need not prove intent to discriminate; relo-
cation plan having " 'accidental' " impact on blacks violates equal protection); Kennedy Park 
Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum) ("thoughtless-
ness rather than a purposeful scheme" to discriminate racially nevertheless violates equal protection 
when it imposes severe disadvantage on community long isolated and denied services); United 
States ex rel Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 65 (5th Cir. 1962) (federal courts in Alabama, where 
there exists long history of intentional discrimination against black jurors, discern racial discrimina-
tion in juror selection by looking at "objective results" rather than proof of "ill will [or] evil 
motive"). 
65. See supra notes 26 & 39 (citing voting and jury service cases). 
66. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967) (District of Columbia's school 
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While the Hawkins approach dominated the Fifth Circuit as a conse-
quence of its heavy caseload of racial problems, the state-tort-incorporation 
doctrine of Whirl offered the better long-term enticement to courts because it 
held out great hope of providing standards for the myriad due process claims 
that could arise under § 1983 after Monroe. Some cases were notable be-
cause they presented factual situations that the Supreme Court would later 
resolve in anothe~ way, using Constitution-based standards. In Madison v. 
Manter 67 the First Circuit analogized to the common law in holding that 
negligence in seeking a search warrant would not support a claim of constitu-
tional deprivation; rather "Massachusetts common law" required a showing 
ofmaliciousness.68 Aldridge v. Mullins 69 involved a police officer in Tennes-
see who shot a fleeing suspect and sought to excuse his acts as within his 
discretion. Citing Tennessee common law, which the court held applicable 
under § 1983, the judge ruled that the officer's conduct constituted at least 
the "gross negligence" that was actionable under common law.70 
That these and other courts should have focused so single-mindedly on 
state law should not have been surprising .. The Supreme Court had seem-
ingly encouraged it with its own use of the approach in three areas that were 
integral parts ofthe civil rights territory. First, inP.ierson v. Ray, 71 the Court 
found state law pertinent iri the development of the official immunity defens~. 
Freedom riders in that case sued police officers and a local Mississippi judge 
for falsely charging them with a breach of the peace. In creating an immu-
nity for the defendants, the Court reasoned that the legislative history and 
language of§ 1983 gave no "clear indication" that "Congress intended to ab-
rogate immunities long-established in American common law, including one 
that provided police officers with a defense of "good faith and probable 
cause."72 The Supreme Court had further reinforced this line of reasoning in 
a series of cases that held that drafting deficiencies in civil rights statutes 
should be cured by referring to state law. 73 Finally, beginning in the early 
system riddled with unconstitutional discrimination). The italicized phrase cited in Hawkins, see 
supra text accompanying note 63, is a quotation of a quotation, the trail leading back to Hobson, 
even though the Fifth Circuit never cited the case. Judge Skelly Wright supported his views in 
Hobson by alluding to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (legislative apportionment reflecting 
no policy fails arbitrariness test of equal protection), and otherwise unnamed "Supreme Court deci-
sions in the last decade." 269 F. Supp. at 497 & n.167. 
67. 441 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1971). 
68. Id. at 538; see Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1979) (similar issue resolved by 
reference to Constitution-based norms). · 
69. 377 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1973). 
70. I d. at 858; see Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1985) (similar issue resolved by reference 
to fourth amendment). 
71. 386 u.s. 547 (1967). 
72. Id. at 555. 
73. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1969) (when statutory remedies 
for civil rights violations are deficient, state law for damages may be applied unless inconsistent with 
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1970s, the Court created a law of procedural due process that turned to state 
law for the very definition of the liberties that would be protected by that 
version of the due process clause. 74 
The courts in Whirl, Madison, and Aldridge formed a perfectly logical 
judgment: if the overall standard of care or mental element applicable to a 
given situation is the combination of the state-of-mind that the plaintiff must 
prove discounted by any mental elements that would provide a defense;75 and 
if the mental elements relevant to the immunity defense are found by resort 
to state tort law; then surely the plaintiff's elements should be found in the 
same source-state tort law. Similarly, an experienced judge might have 
thought that if the very definition of rights under procedural due process 
depends at times on state law, then state law can play a role in ascertaining 
the standard of care imposed by constitutional law. 76 
Indeed, the reasoning appears to be so logical that courts still find it seduc-
tive. Only four years ago, in Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco 17 the Second 
Circuit imitated Whirl in a case presenting claims the court characterized as 
"in the nature of those for arrest without probable cause, false imprisonment, 
malicious prosecution, and conspiracy."78 The mental elements-in fact all 
the elements-of the plaintiff's case were found by referring to state law: 
Because there are no federal rules of decision for adjudicating section 1983 
actions that are based upon claims of malicious prosecution, we are re-
quire~ ... to tum to state law .... In doing so, we find that New York law 
permits recovery on a claim of malicious prosecution only where plaintiff 
Constitution and laws of United States). The circuit courts had developed an imitative jurispru-
dence under§ 1983 that used state law to govern statutes of limitations, see Beard v. Stephens, 372 
F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1967) ("We look first to federal law to determine the nature of the claim and 
then to state court interpretations of the state's 'statutory catalogue' to see where the claim fits into 
the state scheme."), and wrongful-death-like claims, Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 405-06 (5th 
Cir. 1961) (state law authorizing survivors to sue adopted in § 1988 suit alleging police beat de-
ceased to death); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985) Oater Supreme Court affirmation of 
application of state statute of limitations); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 585, 592 (1978) (same 
regarding adoption of state survivorship rules). 
74. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (plaintiff's due process protec-
tions stem from his state property interest in his employment contract and not from any constitu-
tional property rights); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) ("existence of rules and 
understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials," gives plaintiff opportunity to prove 
legitimacy of his claim, proof of which would obligate officials to grant hearing at plaintiff's re-
quest); see generally Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
1193 (1982). 
75. Cf. Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 68 (adopting view that final state-of-mind requirement will 
be standard of care necessary for plaintiff to prove, subject to "good faith" defense available as of 
writing of article). 
76. Cf. Dollar v. Haralson County, 704 F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1983) (court's citations indi-
cate influence of procedural due process notions that depend on state law; ultimate decision, how-
ever, turns on constitutional norms). 
77. 750 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, Cerbone v. Conway, 479 U.S. 84 (1986). 
78. Id. at 207. 
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has established four elements ... , [including] that the criminal proceeding 
was instituted in actual malice. 79 
There followeq a two-page discussion of the New York law of malicious 
prosecution as applied to Ms. Conway's claim. 80 
While few other recent cases are so overt in their adoption of state tort 
law, some can be found that see state law as persuasive or at least instructive. 
In Dollar v. Haralson County, 81 for example, the court faced the issue of 
whether a county that had failed to build a bridge over a creek violated the 
constitutional rights of children who were subsequently killed in a car swept 
away at a ford in the creek. The issue in the§ 1983 action was whether the 
county had a legal duty to construct the bridge. In answering the question 
the Eleventh Circuit observed that 
[o]ur conclusion in this case is informed, though not controlled, by Georgia 
law .... Georgia cases draw a clear line between a discretionary nonfea-
sance and the negligent maintenance of something erected by the local gov-
ernment in its discretion .... 
Since the county was under no duty to build the bridge, [the plaintiff's 
loss] ... is not compensable under section 1983.82 
In an area in which thoughtful law professors, until very recently, pressed 
arguments about the necessity of applying common law, 83 one can under-
stand how courts became confused by the Supreme Court's apparently con-
flicting signals. 84 
C. THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS: THE SUPREME COURT'S 
NEW APPROACH 
1. The Road to Daniels and Davidson 
The Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the Whirl approach as 
early as 1976. A short opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist in Paul v. 
Davis 85 rejected the contention that "the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and section 1983 make actionable many wrongs inflicted 
by government employees which had heretofore been thought to give rise 
79. Id. at 214 (citations and footnote omitted). 
80. See id. at 214-15 (discussing New York common law of malicious prosecution). 
81. 704 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1983). 
82. Id. at 1544. 
83. See supra note 57 (citing articles that argue for use of common law). 
84. Although the Supreme Court has now decided that§ 1983's standards of care are to be found 
by reference to constitutional norms, see infra Part Il.c.2, the Court itself continues occasionally to 
· refer uncritically to common law· as dictating the liability rules for§ 1983. See Malley v. Briggs, 
475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (dictum) (causation issues under§ 1983 are decided by reference to 
common law). 
85. 424 u.s. 693 (1976). 
1456 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:1441 
only to state-law tort claims."86 Justice Marshall's opinion in Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 87 handed down the same year, at least implicitly rejected Whirl. In it the 
Court rebuffed a prisoner who claimed an eighth amendment right to be free 
from medical malpractice while incarcerated. It concluded that the state law 
of negligence was irrelevant to such eighth amendment claims and that only 
"deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause 
of action under section 1983."88 Baker v. McCollan 89 also appeared to con-
tradict Whirl on very similar facts, holding that a person arrested due to 
misidentification had suffered no due process loss.90 
Yet the line to a new position was not a straight one. Parratt v. Taylor 91 
rejected a prisoner's claim for constitutional protection for his $23 hobby kit, 
but in a most curious fashion. Justice Rehnquist, this time for a virtually 
unanimous Court, again stated his theme from Paul of the different sources 
of federal constitutional and state common law, and for the first time he 
explicitly framed the relevant issue as one related to federal constitutional 
law.92 The Court's remaining statements tended, however, to nullify the 
clarity of its initial thrust. The opinion noted that section 1983, as a matter 
of statutory construction, "has never been found by this Court to contain a 
state-of-mind requirement"93-an important holding, but one perfectly con-
sistent with WhirL 94 Moreover, in making its constitutional inquiry, the 
Court construed the case as presenting a procedural due process claim and 
proceeded to craft a rule that reinforced the habit of looking to state-court 
causes of action to determine adequacy of remedies.95 Finally, and almost 
without discussion, the Court mentioned the dreaded "N" word, "negli-
gence," holding that negligent deprivations are covered by the right to proce-
dural due process.96 While astute judges learned to live with Parratt, 97 the 
86. ld. at 699. 
87. 429 u.s. 97 (1976). 
88. Id. at 105. 
89. 443 u.s. 137 (1979). 
90. I d. at. 143-44. But see Whirl, 407 F.2d at 792 (court allows jailor time to learn his mistake; 
no "instant tort"). Baker's overall approach significantly paralleled the position that the Court 
would later clarify, that the issue was one of constitutional, not state tort, law. 443 U.S. at 146. 
91. 451 u.s. 527 (1981). 
92. ld. at 534-35. 
93. ld. at 534. 
94. See supra text accompanying note 44 (Whirl found no single standard for § 1983; supplied 
content by analogy to state tort law). 
95. 451 U.S. at 543-44; see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (progenitor of Parrott). 
This doubly focuses procedural due process on state law, since the identification of protected liberty 
and property rights also turns on state law. See supra note 74 (citing cases looking to state law for 
liberty and property interests); see also Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466-
67 (1981) (state law creates no liberty interest for prisoner; decided same term as Parrott). 
96. Parrott, 451 U.S. at 436-37. 
97. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Par-
rott's concern with adequacy of state remedy relates to procedural due process claims, not substan-
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prior confusion became chaos for many others. 98 
2. Daniels, Cannon, and Davidson and the Rise of Constitution-Based 
Standards of Care 
1457 
Three years ago, in the companion cases of Daniels v. Williams99 and Da-
vidson v. Cannon, 100 the Supreme Court finally introduced an order to this 
universe. Both cases involved plaintiffs who had suffered injuries in prison, 
Davidson in a prison brawl (of the type portrayed on late-night television 
programs)101 and Daniels in a classic slip-a~d-fal1 case (beloved by lawyers 
who advertise on late-night television programs). 102 Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority in Daniels, first refined his statement from Paul, carefully 
stating that § 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of 
that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right. " 103 
Then the Court added the coup de grace for Whirl: "in any given section 
1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitu-
tional right,· and depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be 
enough to state a claim. "104 · 
The Court then demonstrated its approach in a way that eliminated all 
ambiguity: it first couched in constitutional terms its concerns about displac-
ing state tort law; then it articulated the concerns that specifically underlie 
the due process clause (reversing Parratt's unreasoned holding regarding neg-
ligence);105 and finally, it reinforced its point by holding that the prisoners' 
claims were "remote from the [constitutional] concerns just discussed."106 
Justice Rehnquist closed by reiterating his opening idea: 
That injuries inflicted by governmental negligence are not addressed by the 
United States Constitution is not to say that they may not raise significant 
legal concerns and lead to the creation of protectible legal interests. The 
enactment of tort claim statutes, for example, reflects the view that injuries 
caused by such negligence should generally be redressed. It is no reflection 
tive due process cases); Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 724 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); O'Quinn 
v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); see generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327, 336-40 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (distinguishing between incorporated due process and 
substantive due process as opposed to procedural due process). 
98. See Mann v. City of Tuscan, 782 F.2d 790, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1986) (concurrence suggests 
Parratt reverses Monroe's rule against exhaustion of state judicial remedies). 
99. 474 u.s .. 327 (1986). 
100. 474 u.s. 344 (1986). 
101. Id. at 345-46 (following threat from another inmate, reported to authorities, inmate at-
tacked Davidson with fork). 
102. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (Daniels allegedly slipped on pillow negligently left on stairs and 
fell). 
103. Id. at 329-30 (emphasis added). 
104. /d. (emphasis added). 
105. /d. at 330-31. 
106. Id. at 332. 
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on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance 
of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same. concerns. 107 
Section 1983, of course, is nothing but a statute, and the underlying prob-
lem from Whirl to Daniels and Davidson has been the same: what does the 
statute mean when it creates an action against an official who "subjects" a 
person, or "causes [a person] to be subjected," to a "deprivation of any rights 
... secured by the Constitution"?108 There are surely enough words present 
in the statute to justify whatever state-of-mind requirements the Court 
wishes to find. Intellectually, t;here are at least three possibilities: Whirl's 
incorporation of state tort norms, Daniels' reference to constitutional norms, 
and the never-discussed option of finding norms in § 1983 itself. 
The Whirl option lost support based on the Court's wariness about creat-
ing federal statutory law that would significantly overlap with state law, at 
least state law concerning state officials. 109 But why not choose the second 
option and use statutory law-§ 1983 itself-rather than constitutional law 
as the source for the standards of care? Apparently, this option never oc-
curred to members of the Court, probably because the statutory language on 
its face refers to constitutionally created rights110 and because the Court had 
already solved related problems by adopting the view that § 1983 itself cre-
ates no substantive rights. 111 If the Justices had considered this option, they 
would probably have rightly rejected it. A purely statutory approach to de-
veloping standards of care would have faced at best a dearth of sources in the 
legislative history, 112 or at worst either a set of standards tied to long-dead 
107. Id. at 333 (footnote omitted). Significantly, the dissenters in the companion cases did not 
disagree with the majority's approach, only its result. Justice Brennan rejected mere negligence as a 
constitutional standard of care, but would have covered official recklessness. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 
349 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Marshall agreed that the Constitution, not 
common law, governed, although they thought that in the prison context some forms of negligence 
might offend due process. /d. at 353-54 (Biackmun, J., dissenting and Marshall, J., joining). 
108. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982). 
109. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332 (due process notions do not "supplant traditional tort law in 
laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society"); 
supra text accompanying notes 85-90 (describing Court's rejection of Whirl); cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (fourteenth amendment not "a font of tort law to be superimposed'' on states). 
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) ("rights ... secured by the Constitution"); see Huffman v. Western 
Nuclear, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2087, 2092 (1988) (statutory language is best indicator of what Congress 
meant); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420 (1968) (statutory interpretation begins 
"with the language of the statute itself" in interpreting civil rights laws). 
111. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
112. The legislative materials are admittedly vast and often explicit, but specific references to the 
section that would become§ 1983 are few. See generally J. CooK & J. SOBIESKI, CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACTIONS 1-320 (1986) (collecting sources). Moreover, since§ 1983 was originally adopted as part 
of a larger effort to suppress the Ku Klux Klan and guarantee rights for blacks, see id. §§ 1-318 to 
-320, 1-333 to -335; Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97-102 (1971) (discussing background of 
§ 1983's cohort, § 1985(3)); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961), the debates are directed 
toward a more outrageous and topically limited set of issues than§ 1983 has come to cover. Under 
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legislators who never foresaw the Constitution's growth or a set of standards 
admittedly articulated as judge-made common law. 113 As nebulous and ma-
nipulable as constitutional law has become, it at least provides a coherent 
basis for discussion. 
The Court's new approach to defining standards of care for§ 1983-find-
ing them not in the statute, but in the Constitution, and recognizing that they 
vary with the constitutional right asserted-serves as an extraordinarily 
strong organizing principle. In retrospect, it explains a great number of 
cases, whether based on equal protection, incorporated rights, or general sub-
stantive due process, in which the Court never thought it relevant to explain 
the basis for the constitutional claim at issue. 114 These cases demonstrate the 
full richness and variety of standards that the Court has developed in the 
name of constitutional law. 115 The Daniels approach leaves each intact for 
use under § 1983.116 
these circumstances the precise examples given in legislative discussion cannot properly give mean-
ing to the general scheme. See Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1394 
(1988) (discussing unanticipated consequences of evolving line of interpretation). 
113. See supra note 57 (discussing commentators who argue for alternative readings of § 1988 
that would import common law into§ 1983). 
114. Professor Kirkpatrick's 1977 article concerning state-of-mind requirements presciently fore-
saw some of these issues. Written at a time when the qualified immunity defense still contained an 
element of good faith, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315 (1975) (official immunity standard 
contains subjective element), rev'd, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), Kirkpatrick focused 
much of his attention on the now-irrelevant net mental element applicable under§ 1983. See supra 
note 75 and accompanying text (referring to standard of care imposed discounted by good-faith 
immunity). He correctly predicted that the Supreme Court would find relevant state-of-mind re-
quirements in the specific constitutional right sought to be enforced. Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 
49. But his attempt to place each constitutional right into a predetermined category of torts, with 
an appropriate mental element ranging from intent to strict liability, unfortunately redirected his 
thesis toward tort law rather than constitutional law. See infra PART III (discussing uses and limi-
tations of tort analysis in § 1983 cases). 
115. They include: office searches under the fourth amendment, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 
709, 725-26 (1987) ("reasonableness" if work-related); prison disturbances and the eighth amend-
ment, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (intent to harm); procedural due process, 
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31 (more than negligence, probably "deliberate decisions"); establishment 
of religion, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985) (purpose or primary effect of promoting 
religion, or unnecessary entanglement between state and religious institutions); fourth amendment 
claim of seizure by use of deadly force, Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-9 (probable cause and "reasonable-
ness"; per se rule); due process liberty interest of pretrial detainees, Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 
576, 584 (1984) ("intent" to punish); vagueness of statutes, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-
58 (1983) (statute unconstitutional if vaguely written; intent to harm through vagueness not dis-
cussed); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (intent not to be measured by 
reasonable foreseeability); prison medical care and the eighth amendment, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("deliberate indifference" to serious medical needs); racial and sex-based dis-
crimination, Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-68 ("intent" to discriminate). The list is 
illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
116. As I shall make clear in Part III, the list in the preceding footnote is highly misleading 
because it may leave the impression that all that is at issue here is compiling a list of state-of-mind 
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II. CREATING THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HOW AND WHY 
SECTION 1983 AFFECTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. A MISLEADING TRUISM AND TWO PATTERNS IN IDENTIFYING 
STANDARDS OF CARE 
1. The Truism that Section 1983 Lacks Content 
Even prior to Daniels and Davidson the Supreme Court created a truism 
that would make those decisions possible. In cases dealing with separate but 
parallel issues, the Court repeatedly described both § 1983 and a closely re-
lated conspiracy statute as purely procedural vehicles having no substantive 
content of their own. 117 It was this fundamental truism that opened the way 
to reading Constitution-based standards of care into § 1983. 
Yet the Court's newly recognized principle !)f referring to constitutional 
law to identify standards of care for§ 1983 actions has one enormous initial 
flaw: the Constitution contains not one single reference to such tort-like 
standards of care. It is only partly facetious to say that the Court has discov-
ered these standards in the same way that it generally discovers constitu-
tional norms-it has made them up. What I propose to show here is that the 
constitutional law created in this area substantially differs from traditional 
constitutional law and that it is § 1983 itself that makes the law different. In 
short, the fundamental truism noted above is quite misleading, for while 
§ 1983 may in some technical sense possess no substantive content of its own, 
it definitely colors the constitutional content that the Court pours back into 
the statute. 
The Supreme Court has accumulated a number of decisions that create 
Constitution-based standards of care for§ 1983 actions. All share one strik-
ing feature: in them the Court uses tort concepts in defining constitutional 
law. 118 The cases, however, follow two distinct patterns. One reflects the 
need to charge juries in § 1983 actions and defines constitutional interests 
requirements. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 50-70 (compiling such a list). It is equally impor-
tant to identify constitutional duties against which the mental elements are measured. 
117. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (in evaluating 
scope of jurisdictional statute Court held that § 1983 does "not provide for any substantive rights" 
but "'only gives a remedy'" (citations omitted)); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 
442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979) (holding that § 1985(3), a conspiracy statute having its source in same act 
as § 1983, "creates no rights," but rather "is a purely remedial statute, providing a civil cause of 
action when some otherwise defined federal right ... is breached" (emphasis in original)). The 
approach was continued in the cases arising under the "and laws" language of§ 1983, Maine v. 
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1980) (section 1983 provides remedy for Social Security Act violation); 
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981) (section 
1983 provides no remedy for Federal Water Pollution Control Act violations); Wright v. City of 
Roanoake Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 429 (1987) (section 1983 provides remedy for 
violation of rights established in Housing Act of 1937). All of these cases consider§ 1983 to be a 
remedial provision that finds its substantive content in other sources. 
118. See generally supra note 115 (noting torts language employed in a variety of§ 1983 cases). 
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with words and phrases taken directly from tort law. The other, reflecting 
the dominant history of federal judicial control over constitutional law, relies 
upon words and phrases taken from constitutional law, although apparently 
altered to display tort-like behavior and to serve a tort-like role. 
2. Standards that Adopt Phrases from Tort Law: The Individuation of 
Constitutional Norms 
The line of cases that uses tort phrases to define constitutional standards is 
illustrated by a pair of prisoners' rights cases in which the plaintiffs claimed 
rights under the eighth amendment. In Estelle v. Gamble, 119 perhaps the 
earliest case to consider the independent creation of constitutional standards 
of care, 120 an inmate argued that the prison doctors negligently cared for him 
after a bale of cotton fell on him during a work detail. 121 He claimed that the 
doctors' negligence violated his eighth amendment right, as applied to the 
states through the fourteenth, to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment.122 In rejecting a state-tort negligence standard for this claim, the 
Court noted that any adopted standard must grow from the "Amendments 
[invoked] and our decisions interpreting them."123 There followed a discus-
sion of such eighth amendment standards, developed in criminal cases, with 
citations to the usual tests, "evolving standards of decency" and "wanton 
infliction of pain." 124 
Based on its review of these traditional tests, the Court created a constitu-
tional standard to guide the provision of prison medical care. Only "deliber-
119. 429 u.s. 97 (1976). 
120. More than three decades earlier, in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944), the plaintiff 
claimed in a§ 1983 suit that Chicago-area election officials disobeyed state law in order to deprive 
him of election to state office. /d. at 5. Since state-election claims not involving race were at that 
time outside the protection of federal constitutional law, the Court construed the complaint as 
presenting the bold claim that violation of state law by state officials also violates federal constitu-
tional law. The Court rejected the claim out of hand. /d. at 11 ("Mere violation of a state statute 
does not infringe the federal Constitution."). While that part of its decision has great relevance to 
the issues to be discussed here and in Part III, the case came so far before post-Monroe development 
of constitutional torts that its reasoning shows little indication of current approaches. It does show, 
however, some early appreciation of the idea that a mental element-intent to discriminate-may 
be used to distinguish federal from state concerns. Jd, at 10. 
121. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99. 
122. /d. at 101-02 . 
.123. /d. at 102. . 
124. Id. at 102-06 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("evolv-
ing standards of decency") and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
("unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain")). Virtually all of the cases upon which the Court 
relied involved the death penalty or other court-imposed punishment. The Court turned to state 
legislation and the common law to support its conclusion regarding provision of medical care to 
prisoners, id. at 103 & n.8, 104 & n.9 (citing numerous state statutes as codifying common law and 
other proposed minimum standards), as well as to a series of lower federal court decisions, id. at 
104-05 & nn. 10-12 (citing opinions from seven circuit courts of appeals). 
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ate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 
'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' ''I25 held the Court; mere "inad· 
vertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to ... offend 
'evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment."I26 
Estelle, therefore, remarkably resembles the great majority of cases that con· 
stitute the body of eighth amendment jurisprudence, cases in which the 
Court, in a particular context, defines what is constitutionally permissible 
punishment. I27 
Estelle differs from most eighth amendment cases, however, in that its rul· 
ing seeks to do more than settle the very punishment issue before the 
Courti28 or refine the generic word tests of the law;I29 rather, it creates a rule 
that can be enforced by factfinders in the cases that follow. This develop-
ment is matched in eighth amendment jurisprudence only by the radical pro· 
cedural due process cases of the 1970s that require factfinders to carry out 
the individuation of constitutional norms in death·penalty cases.t30 In the 
civil context this parallel individuation of constitutional law operates as tort 
law, and it is not surprising to see the Court adopt a phrase from torts, "de· 
liberate indifference," to reflect constitutional norms and allow juries to en· 
force them. 
Following Estelle, courts and commentators understood its standard to ap· 
ply to all eighth amendment claims,IJI but the Supreme Court disabused 
them of that notion in Whitley v. Albers, I32 a§ 1983 suit brought by a pris· 
oner harmed by guards during the quelling of a prison disturbance. Justice 
O'Connor's majority opinion cleverly distinguished Estelle on grounds famil· 
iar to every constitutional lawyer: the earlier case rightly saw little state in· 
terest in allowing inadequate medical care, but the "balancing [of] competing 
125. Id. at 104 (citation omitted). 
126. Id. at 105-06 (footnote omitted). 
127. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-96 (1977) (plurality opinion) (death sentence for 
rape grossly disproportionate to offense because outside consensual norms); supra note 124 (citing 
eighth amendment cases). 
128. See Louisiana ex rei. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947) (second execution 
attempt, following ineffective first attempt, not an eighth amendment violation). 
129. See supra note 124 (citing eighth amendment cases). 
130. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding system that 
"focus[es] the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized char-
acteristics of the individual defendant"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) 
(plurality opinion) (mandatory death penalty for particular class of crimes unconstitutional); see 
also Black, Due Process for Death, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 4-12 (1976) (discussing due process 
problems in mandatory death penalty statutes). 
131. See Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 751 F.2d 1448, 1452 (5th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing Estelle to prison suicide case); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 162-63 (4th Cir. 1980) (protec-
tion of prisoners from sexual assault); see a/so S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
LITIGATION 69 (1st ed. 1979) (opining in early years following Estelle that its standard is applicable 
generally to eighth amendment claims). 
132. 475 u.s. 312 (1986). 
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institutional concerns" would require a different result when restoration of 
prison order was at stake.133 The prison's interest in order was "undoubt-
edly" strong, non-rioting prisoners shared that interest, and the Court men-
tioned no cognizable riotous interests of the rioting prisoners. 134 In this 
context, the Court held, the Estelle standard would have allowed too much 
judicial second-guessing of prison personnel. 135 
Given the balance of competing interests, the rights of inmates must be 
defined at a lower level of judicial protection, said O'Connor, a level captured 
by an alternate standard of care. To capture the constitutional idea of prohib-
iting wanton infliction of pain would require inquiry into " 'whether force 
was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' " 136 The 
Court later described the state-of-mind showing in terms of intent, an "intent 
to punish."137 
A variation on Whitley's standard has since been applied to a series of 
other cases in which prisoners have claimed rights violations but the Court 
has seen no rights, 138 thus confirming that there are at least two standards of 
care that may apply to eighth amendment claims. Despite the different rule 
created in Whitley, however, the rulemaking process employed in that case 
closely resembles that used in Estelle in that the Court refers to traditional 
constitutional norms for the amendment at issue and then proceeds to choose 
a familiar phrase from tort law that factfinders can then apply to all future 
situations in the genre. A tort-based phrase is chosen to individuate constitu-
tional interests by focusing on the state of mind of the defendant governmen-
tal official. 139 
3. Standards that Use Phrases Taken from Constitutional Law: 
Individuation, Yet Also Institutionally Oriented Inqui!ies 
The cases that adopt torts phrases contrast with a second, short line of 
133. Jd. at 320. 
134. Jd. at 320-21. 
135. Jd. at 320. This theme continued with much greater force when Justice O'Connor applied 
her proposed standard to the facts of the case. See id. at 1086-88 ("neither judge nor jury [may] 
freely substitute their judgment for that of officials," and all plaintiff's evidence deemed unpersua-
sive of officials' states of mind). 
136. ld. at 1085 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
1033 (1973)). 
137. Jd.; cf. id. at 320 ("wanton willingness"). 
138. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59. 
139. For other examples of the use of tort-like phrases to identify state actors who behave uncon-
stitutionally, see Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31 (more than negligence, probably a "deliberate" deci-
sion); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55-56 (purpose in establishment clause inquiry); Village of Arlington 
Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-66 (intentional racial discrimination); Mount Healthy School Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-86 (1977) (intent to discharge employee for content of speech). 
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decisions in which the Court has created constitutional tort standards of 
care. In this second line the Court has captured constitutional ideas by 
adopting familiar constitutional words and phrases. The best example of this 
type is Tennessee v. Garner, 140 a § 1983 action brought by the parent of a 
young man killed by a police officer exercising statutorily authorized discre~ 
tion to use deadly force against fleeing felons. 141 Justice White's majority 
opinion began by asserting, without citation, that "there can be no question 
that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure" within the meaning 
of the fourth amendment. 142 Following the pattern of turning to constitu~ 
tionallaw to find § 1983 standards of care, the Court then focused its atten~ 
tion on traditional fourth amendment concerns. 
The dominant concerns of fourth amendment jurisprudence, probable 
cause and reasonableness, 143 led the Court to an extended discussion of the 
"balancing" of individual and governmental interests and an inquiry into the 
"totality of the circumstances,"144 in order to decide the constitutionality of 
the shooting. Pointedly noting that the authorizing statute was not unconsti~ 
tutional on its face, 145 the Court set out its standard to guide future 
factfinders: when the shooting officer has "probable cause to believe that the 
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to 
others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using 
deadly force." 146 
While Garner's standard provides some individuation by calling for in~ 
quiry into the particular police officer's informational basis for inferring 
probable cause, the very use of traditional constitutional law phrases raises 
the specter that direct judicial balancing, rather than jury determination of 
the defendant's state-of~mind, will determine the outcome of the case. The 
Court has apparently suppressed this possibility in Garner itself by adding a 
per se quality to the "reasonableness" inquiry: using ·deadly force against a 
fleeing felon without the requisite probable cause is per se unreasonable. But 
with such a strong tradition of judicial determination of probable cause, it is 
quite possible that courts may intrude on the jury and determine that any 
given quantum of evidence does or does not establish probable cause as a 
matter oflaw. 147 Similarly, once the issue moves from use of deadly force to 
140. 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
141. /d. at 4-5. 
142. /d. at 7. 
143. /d. at 7-8. 
144. /d. at 8-11. 
145. /d. at 11. 
146. /d. 
147. Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1987) (in context of defense assertion of 
probable cause to search, Court creates procedures that seek to make issue resolvable by judge 
rather than by jury); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (in defense context, Court creates 
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use of excessive force, Garner's per se rule presumably collapses. 148 Will 
courts that apply fourth amendment analysis to excessive force cases allow 
juries to determine whether force was "reasonable" under the· circum-
stances?149 The individuation visible on the surface of such cases appears to 
mask a traditional constitutional approach that can permit institutional bal-
ancing to overshadow determinations of individual culpability. 
Garner's use of familiar constitutional phrases to create a standard of care 
for § 1983 does not stand alone. The other cases, however, seem even less 
individuated in their inquiries and more oriented toward testing the legiti-
macy of institutionalized concerns. In a series of prisoners' rights cases, 
presenting claims that would receive strict scrutiny if brought against gov-
ernment by private citizens, the Court has developed a similar "reasonable-
ness" test that also resembles and builds on low-level scrutiny. 150 Parts of 
the Court's first amendment and takings clause case law also call for tradi-
tional constitutional law phrases to be read directly into the § 1983 case.151 
I should emphasize that these two patterns of creating constitutional stan-
dards represent tendencies and do not appear to be entirely distinct catego-
ries. This point can be illustrated by allusion to the cases that define rights of 
pre-trial detainees. Since such persons have not yet been convicted, and may 
never be, they have no rights under the eighth amendment. 152 The Court has 
nevertheless recognized a general due process right to freedom from the in-
fliction of punishment before conviction, a right that the Court in Bell v. 
Wolfish 153 held to be implicated only when restrictions on such detainees 
objective "reasonable police officer" against which judge may measure defendant's probable cause 
to search). 
148. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 14-15 (it is deadliness of force in context of crimes not punishable by 
death that leads to per se rule of unreasonableness). 
149. Cf. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d. 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1987) (adopting Garner's reason-
ableness phrase for excessive force cases). 
150. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2405-06 (1987) (free exercise of religion, 
emphasizing no less-drastic-means test); Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2260-61 (1987) (no 
heightened scrutiny of prison marriage and mailing regulations). For a discussion of traditional 
low-level review, see Bennett, 'Mere' Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Demo-
cratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979). 
151. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 & n.7 (1984) (emphasizing possible secular pur-
pose as opposed to actual purpose, thus parallelling low-level scrutiny; rejecting less-drastic-means 
test of high-level scrutiny); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 & 
n.3, 3150 (1987) (adopting "substantial relationship" test for measuring governmental regulations). 
While Nollan was not a§ 1983 case, it presented a federal constitutional claim to state courts that 
would have been equally cognizable as a§ 1983 case. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 
F.2d 1488, 1494-99 (9th Cir. 1987) (when special exhaustion requirements for takings claims have 
been met, claim may be presented to federal court under§ 1983). 
152. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1977) (school child cannot use eighth 
amendment to challenge excessive use of force in paddling because amendment applies only to 
criminal punishments). 
153. 441 u.s. 520 (1979). 
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were so onerous as to be considered punishment.154 In characterizing the 
appropriate constitutional inquiry, the Court chose two countervailing tests, 
one using a phrase from tort law-"intent to punish"-the other a phrase 
adapted from constitutionallaw-"reasonably related to a legitimate govern-
mental objective."tss 
Yet, if the two identified patterns are not entirely distinct, neither are they, 
as the Court sometimes perceives, entirely fungible. Bell v. Wolfish again 
demonstrates the point. The alternative inquiries proposed in that case are 
not in fact opposite ways to ask the same question. Using the tort-based 
"intent-to-punish" standard, for example, one might decide that a particular 
administrator has created a particular apparently reasonable rule for no 
other reason than to harm or beleaguer his charges, and therefore a fact-
finder would find a constitutional violation under§ 1983. Under the consti-
tutionally influenced "reasonably related" test, however, the Court has often 
made it a practice to ignore actually intended goals and to look instead at 
hypothetical goals that decisionmakers might have had in mind. 156 Under 
such an approach, acceptable goals and a reasonable relation between means 
and goals would be found, as indeed they were in Bell itself. 
These observations about differences in standards also demonstrate how 
two cases that superficially appear similar are in fact quite different in focus. 
The Whitley case, for example, tests for the presence of malicious motive by 
permitting inquiry into its opposite-whether the prison official acted in 
good faith for a "legitimate purpose" that the official reasonably perceived to 
be present. 157 That standard appears similar to the standard later adopted in 
another prisoners' rights case, Turner v. Safley, 158 in which the Court 
adopted a test phrased as "reasonably related to a legitimate penological in-
terest."159 While both use the "reasonableness" phrase of low-level equal 
154. Id. at 535. 
155. Id. at 538-39. 
156. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981) (no inquiry 
into actual motive behind distinction between milk containers unless court affirmatively persuaded 
that proffered reason false); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) 
("plausible reasons" supporting a distinction between treatment of two sets of retirees ends inquiry; 
no actual-motive review); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (clas-
sic case in which Court demonstrates deferential review by hypothesizing reasons to support dis-
tinctions between types of advertising). 
157. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. The Court stated the issue in terms of "whether force was 
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the 
very purpose of causing harm." Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) 
(Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). 
158. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). 
159. Id. at 2261; see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987) (similarly 
phrased standard). Both cases involved restriction on prisoners-mail, marriage, and religious ob-
servance regulations-that probably would have been unconstitutional had they been applied to 
ordinary citizens. See supra note 150 (noting standards applied in the two cases). 
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protection, they have entirely different objects in mind: Whitley focuses on 
the subjective intent of the individual officer exercising discretion, while Tur-
ner focuses on some impersonal governmental policy. In short, the Whitley 
case exemplifies the tendency to individuate constitutional norms through 
tort-like creations, while Turner exemplifies the process of adopting constitu-
tional balancing concepts. It is not entirely satisfying, however, simply to 
note that there exist two patterns of decisionmaking and deem the matter 
closed. In the next part I try to identify what it is about § 1983 litigati<?n 
that has led to these patterns. 
B. ELEMENTS IN SECTION 1983 THAT AFFECT THE CREATION OF 
STANDARDS OF CARE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
IN THE PATTERNS 
1. The "Dual Coverage" of Section 1983-0fficial Policy and Official 
Misconduct 
a. Monroe and the Two Patterns. The tendency of the Court to use 
two styles in creating constitutional standards of care--choosing tort phrases 
to reflect deeper constitutional norms and adapting constitutional phrases to 
reflect traditional constitutional norms-revivifies a long-standing schizo-
phrenia in§ 1983 and constitutional torts. The statute dually covers consti-
tutional challenges to official government policy160 and constitutional 
challenges to officers' acts that are in violation of official policy. 161 This dual 
coverage formula, a significant factor affecting the creation of constitutional 
standards of care, can be traced back to the original decision in Monroe. 162 
The precise issue in Monroe was the proper construction § 1983's "under 
color of" law language.163 The defendants' construction would have held 
160. Admittedly the phrase "official policy" has created substantial definitional problems in the 
area of municipal liability under § 1983. See Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: · 
Some Lessons/rom Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1753-54 (1989) (discuss-
ing recent cases). My point has no specific relation to that discussion; I intend only to identify 
decisions reached through authorized local legal processes, those decisions that represent the collec-
tive governmental judgment that is in constitutional decisionmaking balanced against individual 
interests. I include judicial decisions from my post-Erie respect for state courts' power to decide 
what is state law. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29 (discussing Monroe's holding on this issue). One 
might argue that there is a third relevant category, those acts that are not specifically authorized but 
nevertheless fall within the officer's general authority. For purposes of the following discussion, 
such cases are considered in common with those in which official policy is at issue. Cf. Larson v. 
Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693 (1949) (acts within officer's authorized discre-
tion are considered acts desired by government for purposes of sovereign immunity analysis). The 
categories as framed here have no necessary correlation with similar phrases used to determine 
municipal liability. 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 20-25 (discussing facts of Monroe). 
163. This issue itself replicated in statutory form the same issue that the Court faced about fifty 
years earlier in interpreting the state action doctrine of the fourteenth amendment. See Home Tel. 
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official action to be under color of law only if it had been taken in accordance 
or compliance with state law, 164 thus possibly requiring exhaustion of state 
judicial remedies before initiation of the § 1983 suit. 165 The Court rejected 
the argument and instead held that action occurred under color of law even 
when taken in violation of state law. Power conferred by state law creates 
color oflaw, said the Court, and the federal§ 1983 remedy is supplementary 
to any state-created remedy for state-created rights. 166 Thus, § 1983 could 
be used to attack both official policy that violates the fourteenth amendment 
and officers' acts in violation of official policy, provided their acts also con-
travene the fourteenth amendment. 
It would be easy at this stage to hypothesize a direct correlation between 
the two topics covered by Monroe and the two patterns followed by the 
Supreme Court in creating constitutional torts: tort-like phrases would ap-
pear in cases involving official misconduct, while Constitution-based phrases 
would be found in official policy cases. There is a bit of evidence to support 
the proposition, for in Estelle and Whitley, in which tort phrases were used, 
the Court seemed to see the defendants as engaged in ad hoc decisionmaking 
rather than in following some prescribed legislative policy. 167 In the Garner 
case, on the other hand, in which official state policy was at issue, the Court 
used Constitution-based language to create the standard of care. 168 The later 
prisoners' rights cases show an even more pronounced orientation toward 
impersonal inquiry into state policy, 169 the Court displaying virtually no ap-
preciation of the possibility that a warden might be acting outside the param-
eters of official policy. But psychoanalysis of the Justices is a dangerous 
game, and the precedents are simply too few to reach the conclusion that 
standards of care correlate with whether official policy is or is not at issue. 
It is, moreover, unlikely that any such correlation should be developed. 
Section 1983 must apply nationwide, both in jurisdictions in which the pro-
posed constitutional standard has been adopted and in others in which incon-
& Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 289-94 (1913) (city's action need not be approved 
by state courts in order to be state action). 
164. 365 U.S. at 172. 
165. See id. at 183 (rejecting argument because Congress intended§ 1983 to be used without first 
exhausting state judicial remedies). But see id. at 245-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (adoption of 
defense position should not lead to exhaustion requirement; federal courts should consider whether 
defendant's actions are consistent with state law). See generally Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 
457 U.S. 496, 502-07 (1982) (discussing background and policy implications of exhaustion in con-
sidering administrative exhaustion). 
166. 365 U.S. at 183. 
167. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Court's holdings in Estelle and Whitley). 
168. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text (discussing Garner's constitutional standard 
of care language). 
169. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (distinguishing prisoners' rights cases em-
ploying individual officer state-of-mind analysis from those employing official policy analysis). 
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sistent local rules will become unconstitutional. 170 In short, § 1983 may be 
the vehicle for challenging activity that is official misconduct in one locality 
and unconstitutional official policy in another. Any given standard of care-
whether phrased in terms familiar to torts or those familiar to constitutional 
law-must be capable of application in both contexts. 
Although it is probably undesirable to make such a logical correlation, one 
can reach a more basic conclusion: the coverage under§ 1983 of defendants 
who violate state policy has substantially altered the previous thrust of con-
stitutional decisionmaking. It has done this by introducing more individua-
tion into constitutional rules than was previously present. 
b. The New Patterns and the Old Structured Constitutional Law. 
Prior to Monroe, the predominant method of constitutional analysis balanced 
private rights against state interests as expressed in legislation (or through 
some other broadly legitimated decisionmaking process, such as common-
law judicial edicts). 171 The two most used methods of constitutional litiga-
tion tended to ensure that cases were presented as final resolvable issues that 
implicated such state authority. The first method, Supreme Court appellate 
review of a constitutional issue arising in state court, virtually guaranteed 
that only official policy could be attacked, if for no other reason than that the 
state court has approved the state official's position.172 The second method, 
170. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 15-19 (shoot-to-kill rule followed in some states, not in others). 
171. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1-17 (discussing various "models" of constitutional adjudi-
cation, all of which tum on consideration of individual and institutionalized state). In a brief clos-
ing discussion of the problem discussed in this Article, Tribe sidesteps the major intellectual 
problem: first he says that constitutional coverage of an official's ultra vires acts must not be "over-
stated," but then he seems to find it easy to cover virtually all such situations by simply noting that 
"possession of state power" is adequate to convert the officer into "the state." I d. at 1703-05. 
172. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239-40 (1824) (reversing state law and 
"policy" granting steamboat monopoly on interstate waters enforced by state court injunction); 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,425-36 (1819) (reversing state policy of assessing 
tax on federal bank notes and state courts' enforcement of policy); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 352-61 (1816) (state court's holding announced state policy; Supreme Court's 
previous holding that such policy conflicted with federal treaty reiterated in classic cases justifying 
Supreme Court's power to overturn state judicial decrees that enforce unconstitutional state policy). 
In later cases that presented fourteenth amendment issues, the same format for constitutional litiga-
tion predominated prior to Monroe. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1948) (revers-
ing state covenant-enforcing law as employed by state courts to set policy permitting segregation of 
neighborhoods); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1946) (reversing state law and judicial 
enforcement of statute precluding exercise of first amendment right to distribute religious leaflets in 
company town); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (reversing state courts' enforcement of 
city ordinances restricting leafletting in violation of free speech rights); Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45, 58-64 (1905) (reversing state legislative policy, enforced by state courts, of limiting bakers' 
hours). Although the foregoing list presents cases in which state policies were reversed, state policy 
also is the focus of Supreme Court decisions when state judgments are upheld on appellate review. 
See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-81 (1928) (upholding state law, enforced by state court, 
permitting destruction of trees allegedly without adequate compensation). 
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constitutional challenge via a federal bill in equity, 173 also structured litiga-
tion so as to produce attacks on state policy. 174 
173. See Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 
1983, 77 GEo. L.J. 1493, 1494-95 (1989) (federal question statute was "preferred vehicle" for con· 
stitutional challenges against state); Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 
37 CAs. W. RES. L. REV. 396, 448-49 (1987) (discussing implied federal rights actions brought 
under federal question statutes); cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 484-91 (1955) (even 
after integration of law and equi.ty, case sought injunctive relief against constitutional wrongs with· 
out reference to § 1983). The best-known federal equity case is Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908), in which railroad stockholders sought to enjoin the enforcement of allegedly unconstitu· 
tional state-mandated rate schedules. The defendant state attorney general was concededly acting 
pursuant to state statute. Id. at 137-38. 
Young is widely remembered because of the supposed illogical "fiction" it inaugurated. C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 289 (4th ed. 1983). Read together with Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 
287-89 (official action in violation of state law is state action), Young's reasoning has been criticized 
as inconsistently holding that action qualifying as "state action for purposes of the fourteenth 
amendment [is] but merely [an] individual wrong ... for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment." 
C. WRIGHT, supra, at 289-90. Tribe tries to deal with the problem tautologically by arguing that an 
official may act beyond the scope of state law "without thereby forfeiting his state office," L. TRIBE, 
supra note 18, at 1703, an argument that presumably shows that the officer remains a fourteenth 
amendment state actor under such circumstances. Tribe appears erroneously to" assume that mere 
office-holding is sufficient to find state action, a view at odds with the law. See Polk County v. 
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-22 (1981) (state-paid public defender not state actor). More fundamen· 
tally, however, he misses the most critical intellectual issue: how can a decisionmaking process that 
balances governmental and individual interests work when the governmental interest is that of a 
misbehaving individual officer? 
174. See Collins, supra note 173, at 1494-95. These cases followed a format in which plaintiffs 
alleged that a state official enforced an unconstitutional state Jaw (i.e., that he conformed to state 
law), that because the state law was unconstitutional it could not be deemed true state policy, and 
that therefore ·the official would be required to answer personally for invasion of the plaintiff's 
rights. I d. at 1510-11. It is not altogether clear why these cases invariably attacked state statutes or 
official policy,-for the format would appear to work equally well when the official also violated state 
policy. In Home Telephone, the Court had specifically rejected the idea that illegality of an act 
under a state's constitution ousted the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear federal constitutional 
claims, 227 U.S. at 282-96, so presumably the restriction of federal equity attacks to state statutes 
and policies was not dictated by jurisdictional considerations. The Court also expressly noted in 
Home Telephone that the fourteenth amendment extends to "state officers abusing the[ir] powers," 
even when the officers may "deny the power" given them under state law. I d. at 288; cf. C. ABER· 
NATHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL RIGHTS 10 (1980) (asserting that Home Telephone and 
Monroe address the same issue, the former on constitutional grounds and the latter in its interpreta· 
tion of§ 1983). Although the assertion of illegality under state law arose in Home Telephone, as in 
Monroe, at the behest of defendants seeking to dismiss as opposed to a plaintiff actually seeking to 
enforce a combined claim of federal- and state-law illegality, the Court's ruling in Siler v. Louisville 
& Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 190-93 (1909) (joined claims may proceed even if federal qestion 
ultimately not decided), rendered the factor immaterial. 
Perhaps the reason for the practice has simpler, but cumulatively more substantial, explanations. 
First, perhaps there was a broad (even if erroneous) assumption in the legal profession that federal 
courts were to hear constitutional claims against state officials enforcing state law, while state courts 
were to hear claims of violation of state law. See Isseks, Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts to 
Enjoin Unauthorized Action of State Officials, 40 HARV. L. REV. 969, 969 & n.2 (1927) (docu· 
menting confusion among lower courts regarding their power to enjoin acts violative of state law). 
Second, perhaps the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, Pacific Live Stock Co. v. 
Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 451-55 (1916), would have particularly applied to allegations of illegality 
1989] SECTION 1983 AND CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 1471 
Against this backdrop, the constitutional decisionmaking process was un-
derstandably dominated by consideration of official state policy rather than 
officers' misconduct. 175 The constitutional law that grew from this process 
was highly structured and asked institutionally oriented questions. 176 Within 
that structure, however, per se rules are anathema. 177 Every case presents at 
least the possibility of a different result if some new more "substantial gov-
ernmental interest"178 is at stake or some more appropriate means is used. 179 
As this grand structure was building, § 1983 was invoking a procedure 
that would accentuate a different style of constitutional lawmaking. Specifi-
cally, Monroe's interpretation of§ 1983 as authorizing suits against officials 
under state law. Finally, and perhaps most important, even when some claims attacking abuse of 
state power slipped through to the Court, they were simply overwhelmed in numbers by the vast 
majority of cases in which the Supreme Court wanted to 'make law in the early twentieth century, 
cases in which legislatures by official policy chose to regulate labor and welfare. See STONE & 
SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 724-50 (discussing old substantive due process cases). By the time the 
Court turned its attention to non-economic rights and began to create a body of constitutional law 
binding on state and local discretionary officials, see Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Pro-
cess Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 319-20 (1957) (noting slow buildup of 
due process protections), Monroe was standing in the wings to make moot the issue of covering 
misconduct. 
175. Even among those few § 1983 cases that were brought prior to Monroe, most involved at-
tacks on official policy because Home Telephone's constitutional construction of state action had not 
been extended as a matter of statutory construction to § 1983. Cf. Collins, supra note 173, at 1499-
1500 (until the 1960s, Court did not construe§ 1983's "under color of" state law requirement to 
include acts by state officials that violated state law). For an example, see Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 
268, 269-72 (1939) (attack on state voting law). 
Although the reasoning in Home Telephone appeared to cover errant state officers, the actual 
defendant was a city that had set policy through its usual policy-setting organs. See Home Tele-
phone, 227 U.S. at 278-80 (attack on ordinance); cf. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 350 (1879) 
(common-law judge violated state law by practicing racial discrimination in juror selection); Vir-
ginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 314-16 (1879) (same). The few constitutional cases that involved 
official misbehavior are largely limited to criminal prosecutions in which it could be said that state 
policy rather than misbehavior was at issue because state courts had ratified convictions. See Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357-63 (1886) (conviction under discriminatorily administered ordi-
nance); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 371-73 (1880) (discrimination in juror selection for crimi-
nal prosecution). The cases, therefore, stand for little beyond the reasoning that the state judicial 
policymakers also are covered by the fourteenth amendment. See Rives, 100 U.S. at 346-47 (state 
acts through legislative, executive, and judicial authority). 
176. See STONE & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 495-543 (discussing high-level and low-level scru-
tiny under equal protection analysis); id. at 610-65 (discussing middle-level scrutiny). 
177. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706, 717 (1989) (no per se rules for evaluating 
race-based affirmative action programs); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (no per se rule 
against legislation stigmatizing black persons, rejecting concurrence favoring such a rule). Outside 
the area of individual rights, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137-38 (1986) (no per se rule, under • 
dormant commerce clause, against statute discriminating against out-of-state products-baitfish). 
178. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12, 320 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.) (minority representation in school is substantial state interest); Lee v. Washington, 390 
U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (segregation of prisoners during racial riot might be 
substanti!il state interest). 
179. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351-52, 360 (1972) (striking down state residency law 
for voting; shorter residency period would be satisfactory means to effectuate state's interest). 
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acting in violation of state law necessarily altered the constitutional lawmak-
ing process. If§ 1983 could be used to enforce constitutional rights against 
officers who specifically do not represent the governmental interest, how 
could the structured system's constitutional balancing of interests occur? 
One-half of the equation would be missing, or to put it very basically, per-
haps the state's interest when an official violates state law is not the same as 
or as strong as its interest when plaintiffs attack its laws and policies, if for no 
other reason than that the collective judgment of the citizens is not behind 
the erring defendant official.tso 
Some decisions, especially earlier ones, solved this problem by simply as-
suming, without great reflection, that the state actor represents the state's 
interest.l81 One view might characterize the resulting process as adjudica-
tion of hypothetical claims, with the hypothesis that the state supports the 
state-law violator, but that view would raise certain justiciability problems 
for the federal courts that were to hear these cases. 182 Another view would 
recharacterize the scene in terms of responsibility: a state may not empower 
an official and then protect him from personal federal liability (or itself from 
injunctive liability) for the harms caused when he uses that power. 183 
Monroe itself appears to have adopted a somewhat different position-that 
power exercised in the name of the state and made possible by general au-
thority conferred by the state is action by the state. 184 But to recognize the 
force of the holding is only to restate the constitutional problem: how does 
the constitutional law balancing process work when one looks behind the 
180. Cf Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969) (inequality in 
representation in voting vitiates usual presumption of constitutionality because full collective judg-
ment of approval has not been won); United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938) (lack of representation in legislative process may lead to denial of presumption of validity for 
resulting legislation); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7-8, 87-88 (1980) (proposing representa-
tion-reinforcing model of constitutional law on thesis that broadly represented decisions deserve 
deference). 
181. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 170-71 (assuming that usual constitutional rules apply in case in 
which official misconduct alleged); id. at 192-202 (Harlan, J., concurring) (constitutional violations 
present same underlying problem regardless of whether official violated state law); id. at 208-11 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (constitutional analysis condemnatory regardless of whether official 
misconduct present); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945) (assuming that beating of 
suspect presents same due process problem regardless of whether authorized by state law). 
182. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-60 (1911) (barring judicial review of hypo-
thetical questions seeking advisory opinion). 
183. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1704 (except for limited areas such as procedural due pro-
• cess, clothing official with state authority is adequate to create constitutional responsibility). Marti-
nez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 280-83 (1980) (holding that state may erect defenses denying official 
liability), is not inconsistent with this argument because the state-law defenses upheld in that case 
limited a state-created, rather than constitution-based, right. See Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2308-14 (state 
may not enforce state-law created defenses that materially undercut constitutional liability of state 
officers). 
184. 365 U.S. at 184; see Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346-47 (state is conception that may act 
only through real persons). 
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assumption that a state actor represents the collective will and sees only a 
lone gunman with a badge? 
This intellectual conundrum partially explains why the Court is drawn 
toward using tort concepts when it creates standards of care for constitu-
tional torts. First, tort phrases are highly individuated because they focus on 
the state-of-mind of the actor; 185 thus they may. be easily adapted to fit the 
Monroe-type circumstance in which there may be no articulated institutional 
interest, only an eccentric individual defense interest. Second, tort standards 
are derived from a balancing process at common law that traditionally mea-
sured the interests of two competing private citizens, 186 a situation replicated 
under § 1983 when the official defendant acts in contravention of the collec-
tive will as expressed in state law. 
This is not to say that the constitutional standard only balances private 
interests; rather, because the constitutional-tort phrase is stated in terms of 
tortious mental elements, thus requiring no further balancing, it can be ap-
plied easily to circumstances in which the defendant represents no state inter-
est. The tort-based "test" works well in § 1983 cases, therefore, because it is 
equally manageable regardless of whether the defendant has violated or fol-
lowed state law. 187 Any interest that the state might have had was factored 
in when the appropriate tort phrase was initially chosen. 188 
The intellectual conundrum created by dual coverage also may explain 
why the Court has in the last fifteen years been attracted toward intent as the 
predominant mental element for reflecting constitutional norms. 189 Prior to 
the adoption of constitutional tort analysis in Monroe, the intent test had a 
very checkered history in constitutional decisionmaking, 190 but the availabil-
ity of§ 1983 actions to attack official misconduct soon brought new respect 
185. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 6 (5th 
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. It is possible that the state-of-mind element will apply 
to the plaintiff as well, as in contributory negligence or self-defense. This occasionally occurs in the 
creation of constitutional norms. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (per 
curiam) (intent of speaker to communicate is key ingredient in symbolic speech claim); see also infra 
Part II.B.l.c (discussing cases in which "definitional balancing" has been used). But see Pierson v. 
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967) (inviting arrest does not vitiate constitutional claim). 
186. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 5-6. 
187. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (adopting deliberate indifference standard for failure to provide 
prison medical care). 
188. See id. at 108 (considering state interest in developing tort-based standard); Whitley, 415 
U.S. at 320-21 (1986) (explaining Estelle's balancing of interests); supra text accompanying notes 
161-69 (discussing Estelle and Whitley). 
189. See supra note 115 (listing mental elements adopted in various cases). 
190. See supra notes 3S-39 (discussing cases adopting and rejecting intent inquiries); see generally 
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). In 
the first few years after Monroe, the Court occasionally continued to express the view that motive 
was irrelevant in constitutional analysis, see United States v. ·o'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) 
(congressional motivation irrelevant in first amendment case), but such cases soon fell from grace, 
see infra notes 195-96 (citing later cases in which motive considered relevant). 
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for the intent standard. 191 Quite simply, its attractiveness lies in the fact that 
it is more workable than the traditional balancing approaches in the context 
of action that violates state policy. Traditional constitutional law focuses on 
ends and means, with the means test often serving only as a proxy inquiry 
into prohibited ends. 192 In the context of constitutional review of legislative 
action, such a means test avoids the political difficulty of labeling a legislative 
action ill-motivated. But when no policy is at issue and only an individual 
defendant accused of violating state law is present, there is no such etiquette 
problem, and motive may be tested directly. 
Yet the intent test created some new problems even as it ameliorated older 
ones. In order to make the intent test work, the Court needed to identify 
precisely· those ends that are constitutionally forbidden. 193 This the Court 
has done. 194 To the extent that this new thinking raised the specter of facing 
down legislative motives, the Court also has taken some steps to reduce po-
tential conflict. It not only has limited discovery into legislators' motives, 195 
it has more importantly created a mixed-motive defense that is especially 
helpful to legislative bodies. 196 To combat the argument that motive is diffi-
191. See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-68 (intentional discrimination violates ra-
cial-discrimination ban of fourteenth amendment); Doyle, 429 U.S. at 283-84 (intent is relevant in 
case of alleged discharge for exercise of first amendment rights). 
192. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 695 (1977) (unreasonableness of 
means indicates proffered end not actually at stake in use of contraceptives); Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (irrationality of means in protecting in-
state apple consumers fuels concern that intentional discrimination against out-of-state products 
may be at issue); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(legislature's choice of means reveals its true ends); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64 (lack of close connec-
tion between limited bakers' hours and health of bakers shows state law not intended as health or 
labor law). 
193. Cf. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 46 (distinguishing between object intended in 
battery-"to inflict physical injury"-and the object intended in assault-"to arouse 
apprehension"). 
194. Two examples are instructive. When the Court adopted the intent test for race-based equal 
protection claims, in the Arlington Heights case, it soon faced an attempt to read intent as it is 
sometimes read in torts, as a foreseeability test. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 140-43 (2d 
Cir. 1978) (adopting foreseeability test); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 168 
(5th Cir. 1977) (same). The Court decisively rejected that approach and instead tied intent to the 
intent to bring about certain desired, but constitutionally prohibited, ends. See Personnel Adm'r of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (inquiring whether statute benefiting veterans-most 
of whom are men-actually passed to exclude women from benefits). Similarly, in the prison disci-
pline arena, which spans several constitutional rights, the Court has adopted a variant of the intent 
test, one that focuses directly on whether the state actor's end was to carry out permissible ends 
(imposition of order and discipline) or prohibited ends (the imposition of harm for the mere goal of 
punishment). See Whitley, 415 U.S. at 320-21 (rejecting dispute as to efficacy of prison guard's 
actions and requiring showing of intent to harm); Bell, 441 U.S. at 536-37 (1979) (inquiring whether 
pretrial detention served permissible state goals). 
195. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269 & n.18. 
196. See Doyle, 429 U.S. at 285-86 (school board that fired teacher for protected speech may 
escape liability by showing that constitutionally permissible purpose alternatively motivated its de-
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cult to discern, the Court has reintroduced into constitutional law the con-
cept of "good faith," now as an antagonistic measure of constitutionally 
permissible ends.I97 
The Court may also be responding to the dual coverage problem, albeit 
apparently unwittingly, in its rulings on municipal liability. Under Monell v. 
Department of Social Services 198 municipalities and other local government 
units have joined real persons as potential defendants under § 1983, liable 
not automatically under respondeat superior, but only when the decisions of 
high ranking officials "may fairly be said to represent official policy."199 · For 
purposes of ruling on whether an officer's acts may be ascribed to the munici-
pality, Justice White and others have ruled that the Court should use a varia-
tion of the very Brer Rabbit test that was rejected in Monroe in the context of 
finding individual responsibility: officials acting in violation of local law can-
not be said to be acting pursuant to such law, he reasoned, and therefore the 
municipality cannot be held liable in such circumstances. 200 This reasoning 
responds to the dual-coverage conundrum in a very elegant functional man-
ner because of the way in which successful plaintiffs would seek to enforce 
their judgments. When an officer acted in violation of local law, he would 
bear individual responsibility, but when obeying local law he would effec-
tively escape liability.201 Yet, this remains a limited development, restricted 
to local government units. 202 
Even if no direct correlation can be made between Monroe's dual coverage 
and the two patterns used in developing standards of care, one fundamental 
cision); cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (same defense generally available to state 
guilty of racial discrimination, but fails on facts). 
197. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 ("good faith" used as synonym for permissible motive). 
198. 436 u.s. 658 (1978). 
199. /d. at 694. 
200. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 486 (1986) (White, J., concurring). The pre-
cise question was whether an Ohio county could be held liable for a search authorized by th'e 
County Prosecutor. White agreed that it could, reasoning that the attorney possessed policy-mak-
ing power to authorize searches and that no state constitutional, statutory, or local laws expressed 
the government's policy that such unlawful searches were forbidden. /d. at 1301-02. The apparent 
purpose of White's position was to encourage municipalities to draft effective rights-protecting regu-
lations by holding out the prospect that the regulations would insulate the muncipality from liabil-
ity. 
Justice O'Connor concurred in Justice White's reasoning in Pembaur, id. at 1304, and later au-
thored the plurality opinion in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988), which sounded 
similar themes. See id. at 924-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (scope of authority to make policy to 
be determined by reference to state law as construed by state courts). 
201. Since liability under § 1983 is ordinarily joint and severable, cf. Dobson v. Camden, 725 
F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (assuming joint liability), and since judgments could be 
satisfied most easily by collecting in one step from the municipality's deep pocket, a judgment 
against both an officer and municipality would effectively run against the latter alone. 
202. Monell applies only to local government units, not to state-level entities which retain sover-
eign immunity. See Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Auth., 440 U.S. 391,400-01 
(1979) (setting out standards for distinguishing between local and state-level government bodies). 
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observation remains valid. The condensation of two problems-state-sanc-
tioned unconstitutional conduct and unconstitutional officer conduct viola-
tive of state law-under one statute, § 1983, has led to certain conceptual 
problems that are more easily solved when courts phrase their constitutional 
inquiries in terms of state of mind, at least state-of-mind tests that clearly 
delineate the ends forbidden by the Constitution.203 This style of constitu-
tional rulemaking may look odd when compared to the dominant structured 
decisionmaking process of the 1960s and early 1970s. But that is precisely 
the point: § 1983's coverage of state actors' state-law misconduct has 
changed the dynamics of constitutional law and produced a different style of 
constitutional rule. 
c. The New Patterns and "Definitional Balancing. " Although the 
Court's creation of state-of-mind requirements under§ 1983 has led to a con-
stitutional law quite different from the structural constitutional law popular-
ized in the 1960s and 1970s, these new approaches have direct historical 
antecedents in first amendment law, particularly the rules that Nimmer calls 
the product of "definitional balancing. "204 In the area of free-speech analysis 
where a state's interest may be related to the content of speech, the Court has 
created a series.of tests that depart from the predominant balancing model 
not by eschewing balancing altogether, but by choosing a test that describes 
the product of appropriately balanced interests. Such tests then become "a 
rule ... [that] can be employed in future cases."20s 
Such definitional balancing thus eliminates the need to return to overt bal-
ancing of governmental and individual interests in every future case; instead 
the appropriate test is applied to the facts at issue, indicating a preferred 
result.206 While Nimmer has praised the "actual malice" standard of New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 207 the same approach can be seen in several other 
cases. 208 The balancing of interests done to arrive at the appropriate test is 
203. The state-of-mind requirement must be tied to a constitutionally specified duty, a forbidden 
end, in order to achieve the goal of creating a standard of care for § 1983. See infra Part III. 
204. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory applied to Libel 
and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 passim (1968). 
205. Id. at 944. 
206. For an interesting overview of definitional balancing and its chief competitors, "ad hoc 
balancing" (similar to what I have called merely balancing) and "absolutism," see G. GUNTHER, 
supra note 18, at 983-85, 1056-57. 
207. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
208. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973) (for obscenity, multi-part test including 
"appeals to the prurient interest"); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (for 
subversive advocacy, speech "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action is likely to" 
do so); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (in hostile audience situations, "incite-
ment"); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (for inflammatory speech, speech surpasses 
bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes "incitement to riot"), I cannot contend that 
these cases are of exactly the same mold as the§ 1983 cases, for their tests focus more on asserters 
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remarkably similar to that undertaken in some of the § 1983 cases discussed 
above.209 
Although a direct cause-and-effect relation between substance and proce-
dure is difficult to establish, it is at least possible to say that a procedural 
dynamic similar to § 1983 was at work in the definitional balancing cases. 
Although there was an early movement to restrict review to legislative deci-
sions,210 the Court later rejected that approach and developed an active juris-
prudence that justified its inquiry into the constitutionally relevant facts of 
each case.211 Perhaps more important than the Supreme Court's own prac-
tice were the related procedures that it encouraged for lower courts, those 
that entailed considering cases on their individualized facts rather than enter-
taining so-called "facial" or "overbreadth" attacks. 212 These procedural dy-
namics thus permitted the Court in free-speech cases to peer more closely 
into individual circumstances instead of dealing only with institutionalized 
concerns appearing on the face of official policy. 
The recognition of this similar approach in free-speech law allows us to see 
the tort influence on § 1983 in somewhat starker relief, espeCially the 
Monroe-based development of constitutional norms that can be applied to 
officers acting in violation of state law. As we have seen, in the definitional 
balancing cases the Court has created rather black-letter rules that are, like 
those created for§ 1983, susceptible to application in circumstances in which 
the state official has violated state law. Yet, in several areas of free-speech 
jurisprudence, the Court has independently required that the state official be 
acting pursuant to a specific ordinance or statute and failure to act pursuant 
to legislative directive is deemed to be an independent first amendment viola-
tion.213 No similar practice can be found in§ 1983 cases,214 in which courts 
of rights (section 1983 plaintiffs) than on officials (section 1983 defendants)-the opposite of 
§ 1983's focus. But like the§ 1983 cases, these cases adopt tort-like state-of-mind tests rather than 
undertake ad hoc balancing of interests in each new case. 
209. Compare New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254 (individual's free speech interest in criticizing 
state officials affords privilege in libel suit absent malice) with Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (prison 
guards given great deference in quelling prison riot in absence of showing of malice). 
210. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668-70 (1925) (Court will defer to legislative deter-
mination that certain speech involves danger); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 367, 371-72 
(1927) (actual danger presented by speech is unreviewable question of fact, not a constitutional 
question). 
211. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 898 (1982) (reversing damage 
award after review of facts underlying liability for boycott); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 
(1974) (Rehnquist, J.) (reversing obscenity conviction after independent review of facts); Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 & n.8 (1965) (reversing breach of peace conviction after undertaking 
"our independent examination of the record, which we are required to make"). 
212. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973) (limiting overbreadth attacks and 
expressing aversion to facial attacks); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 272-73 (1941) (attacking 
contempt power as applied to speech). 
213. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 (statute clearly defining speech is prerequisite for obscenity con-
viction); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (licensing statute must contain standards to 
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are more likely to follow the maxim that an errant official's violation of state 
law, while not defeating § 1983 liability,215 certainly raises only state-law is-
sues that do not amount to a constitutional violation.216 Perhaps one can 
explain this discrepancy by noting that the demand for statutory authoriza-
tion is properly limited to free-speech cases because of our traditional fear of 
censorship.217 Or perhaps the Court should face the fact that its practice of 
choosing tort phrases to reflect constitutional norms masks the deeper prob-
lem previously noted-that its development of standards for § 1983 has so 
far ignored the fact that no state interest is present to be constitutionally 
balanced when an officer violates state law.21s 
2. The Problem of Charging the Jury: Who Finds Constitutional Facts? 
Monroe v. Pape not only provided a Constitution-based claim for official 
conduct violative of state law, it also provided a federal forum for the 
claim.219 And along with the federal forum goes the right to a jury triaJ.220 
This created a new magnitude of problem for constitutional decisionmak-
ing-how to integrate jury decisionmaking into the traditional judge-domi-
guide administrator); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940) (narrowly drawn statute 
necessary to sustain breach of peace conviction when speech at issue; common law breach of peace 
prosecution inadequate); cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (state court may supply 
standards through statutory interpretation). 
214. In Whitley, for example, the Court defined the constitutional wrong after balancing inter-
ests, see supra text accompanying note 133, labeling a government interest in restoring order as 
weighty and the prisoner's interest in resisting restoration of order very slight. 475 U.S. at 320-21. 
Yet, the balancing might have yielded quite different results if the state had itself forbidden use of 
force. In that case, the officer's interest would not have been a "state" interest, but only an eccen-
tric individual interest. 
215. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167, 183-84 (action in violation of state law is nevertheless state 
action). 
216. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 ·(1944) (violation of state law not itself a constitu-
tional violation); cf. Paul, 424 U.S. at 693, 710 (state law tort does not become constitutional viola-
tion when done by state official). 
217. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (because of censorship possibilities, due 
process value of notice strictly applied when speech at issue); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 
60-61 (1965) (setting out elaborate safeguards that statute must incorporate to avoid potential for 
censorship). Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), which limits "as applied" attacks on 
licensing schemes, id. at 408-11, governs only the timing of constitutional attack, and does not 
negate the command that the standards must be present to guide administrators. 
218. See supra text accompanying notes 180-202 (discussing the difficulties created by dual cov-
erage aspect of§ 1983 as announced in Monroe). 
219. See C. ABERNATHY, supra note 174, at 10 (noting fact of federal court jurisdiction over 
§ 1983 cases). 
220. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974) Gury trial rights 
apply in civil rights suits, particularly Fair Housing Act cases); Harkless v. Sweeney lndep. School 
Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970) (same rules regarding jury trials apply to§ 1983 suits). The 
parties may, of course, relinquish their rights to jury trial, but the possibility of such a trial requires 
that courts adopt standards that will be useful when a jury is employed as factfinder. 
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nated process of protecting constitutional rights.221 Prior to Monroe, federal 
judges realized that factfinding power played a large role in protecting fed-
eral constitutional rights, but their feared principal competitors in factfinding 
were state judges and jurors.222 The mask of federalism concerns was tom 
free after Monroe, forcing federal judges to decide how they could allow any 
other persons, even federal jurors, to share in constitutional adjudication. 
Choosing tort phrases to reflect .cc;mstitutional norms-which would then 
be used to charge the jury-appeared to solve parts of the problem, or so 
judges might have thought. The traditional view is that tort phrases present 
a body of well-established tests that produce somewhat predictable results, at 
least at the margins of jury decisionmaking. 223 In Estelle, for example, the 
Court could adopt the "deliberate indifference" standard with certainty that 
it would produce fewer verdicts for plaintiffs and consequently less federal 
interference with the state's prison medical operations than would a negli-
gence test.224 Psychologically, moreover, the chosen test would permit fed-
eral jurors to involve federal courts only when they were subjectively highly 
outraged by the prisoner's suffering,225 paralleling the Court's determination 
that the eighth amendment forbids only wanton or heinous infliction of 
harm.226 Similarly, ascertaining a defendant's motive or intent is a tradi-
tional kind of inquiry that juries have managed to undertake both in civil and 
criminallaw.227 At least the direction of juries to a single fact makes their 
job more manageable. 
Jury-charging norms made from constitutional-law words and phrases 
cannot claim this same apparent traditional manageability. These phrases 
lack a history of workability with juries-they are judges' talk. More funda-
mentally, however, the vocabulary of constitutional law has acquired a sub-
tlety and nuance, a flexibility, that is designed to give some leeway to the 
federal judge playing her Marbury v. Madison role. "Probable cause," the 
constitutional phrase read directly into § 1983 in Garner, 228 is a good exam-
221. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974) (Supreme Court is ultimate arbiter 
of the Constitution); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (Court may 
declare laws unconstitutional). 
222. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (citing cases in which Court inquires into facts of 
case to determine constitutionality of the defendant's activity). The solution developed in those 
appellate jurisdiction cases could not be carried over to§ 1983 because of the seventh amendment. 
223. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 26-28 (discussing importance of determining 
defendant's motive in establishing liability). 
224. See supra text accompanying note 125 (discussing Estelle standard). 
225. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 9-15, 21-23 (moral considerations affect liability 
and damages, with higher standard such as deliberate disregard adopted to test for greater moral 
outrage). 
226. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
227. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 26-28 (discussing role of state-of-mind 
requirements). 
228. 471 U.S. at 11. 
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pie. As much as the Court attempted in the Warren era to refine the mean-
ing of the phrase,229 it remains flexible and acquires some precision only 
when employed by a judicial officer who has himself accumulated experience 
in balancing police needs against the privacy interests of citizens.230 
This theme-that constitutional law is inherently judicial law-is espe-
cially evident in the number of constitutional tests that purport to inquire 
into the "totality of the circumstances" or otherwise overtly balance inter-
ests.231 It should not be surprising, therefore, that multi-factor charges to 
the jury, such as were once fashionable in excessive force cases, tend to pres-
ent recurring problems.232 The law applied in most circuits to excessive force 
cases came from an early Second Circuit case, Johnson v. Glick, 233 and re-
quired the balancing of at least four separate factors.234 While such an ap-
proach might provide guiding standards for judges, who could look at the 
accretion of case-law determinations on specific facts, juries would be left 
standardless. Indeed, Johnson's demise has ceased to be the relevant issue; 
the question now is whether the Justices can create an alternative that allows 
any role for jurors.235 1 
A full listing of constitutional tests that would make jury instructions 
229. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1964) (anonymous tip from unverified source 
cannot provide probable cause). 
230. This observation is proved primarily by developments in the law of qualified immunity, in 
which the Court has developed an "objective reasonableness test" that courts would apply to dis-
miss claims prior to trial. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986) (adopting standard used 
by judges in ruling on suppression motions); cf. Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271, 1275 (7th Cir. 
1988) (en bane) (question of constitutional violation vel non is for judge acting under a guise of 
ruling on what a "reasonable jury" could determine). 
231. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane) ("objective.reasona-
bleness under the circumstances" is test for probable cause in use of force for arrest); Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (rejecting structured test, adopting "totality-of-the-circumstances" 
test for tip-related probable cause determinations). 
232. See Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 1987) (circuit court noted multi-part test 
and clarified mental element in a manner that allowed jury to focus on three different possibilities); 
Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987) (excessive-force cases dealing with 
arrest incidents treated under more objective fourth amendment standards in which mental ele-
ments irrelevant). 
233. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). 
234. Id. at 1033. The court listed the relevant factors: 
In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such 
factors as [I] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship between the need 
and the amount of force that was used, [3] the extent of the injury inflicted, and [4] 
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. 
Id. (emphasis and numerals added). The court noted, however, that decisions also must be made 
with an awareness that constitutional standards must steer very clear of merely replicating state-tort 
standards. Id. 
235. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (rejecting Johnson, but adopting an-
other balancing test). 
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problematic runs the risk of reductio ad absurdum. Think of a jury instruc-
tion on state action taken from Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 236 or 
imagine directing a jury to decide whether saving a fetal life in a particular 
abortion case is a "compelling state interest."237 Traditional constitutional 
law phrases are inadequate bases for instructing a jury precisely because they 
have no meaning when shorn from the judges who are purposely given lee-
way by the tests. 
Three solutions might be suggested, and the Court has tried them all. 
First, the Court might define with more particularity its constitutional tests 
so as to make them more suita.ble for jury implementati9n. This is arguably 
what the Court did in Garner when it defined the scope of "reasonableness" 
as a constitutional matter-deadly use of force without probable cause to 
fear danger to officer or community is per se unreasonable238-so as to leave 
a much narrower issue for the jury. While this represents an improvement in 
manageability that may ultimately prove itself, it also creates a new and ex-
tensive list of problems similar to those previously faced in ordinary torts' 
nebulous field of negligence: when should certain conduct become a tort per 
se?239 
The second solution would be for the Court to retain some kind of veto 
power over jury decisions by converting triable issues into legal issues. The 
Court also has experimented with this approach, substituting its judgment 
for that of the primary factfinders, and ruling as a matter of law that certain 
evidence either possesses or lacks the requisite power to meet the prescribed 
constitutional test. 240 This approach clarifies the primary legal standard and 
provides fodder for further instructions that could presumably confine a 
236. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The Court's test required "sifting facts and weighing circumstances," 
id. at 722, and contemplated a case-by-case accretion oflaw. While some of these are now in place, 
it seems that substantial balancing-judicial discretion-still necessarily plays a role. See Gilmore 
v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1974) (struggling to apply refined test that aid be-
yond "generalized services" that has a "significant tendency" to promote discrimination could lead 
to finding of state involvement). 
237. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (such test applies to abortion decisions). If it 
is thought that this is a truly legal question that could never conceivably go to the jury, consider a 
more likely factual candidate-whether regulations have a "significant impact" on any given per-
son's exercise of the right. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 
U.S. 416, 434 (1983) (state regulation of abortion procedure places significant burden on exercise of 
right to abortion); cf Memorial Hasp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258-59 (1974) (only 
"penalties" on exercise of fundamental right to travel receive strict scrutiny). 
238. 474 U.S. at 11-12. 
239. Cf PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 227 ("negligence per se" is akin to strict liabil-
ity and consists of doing what is forbidden by statutory rule). 
240. See Whitley, 415 U.S. at 322-26 (extensively reviewing testimony and explaining why it is 
inadequate); supra notes 230-31 (citing cases in which Court retained veto power over factual 
determinations). 
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factfinder in future cases,241 ~hus producing quite typical traditional issues 
concerning what amounts to a tort "as a matter of law."242 This provides a 
judicially manageable way of solving the problem of reconciling juries' 
factfinding with the courts' duty to protect constitutional rights. 
The third attempt to solve the problem of sharing power over constitu-
tional torts is more problematical. Under the guise of altering the qualified 
immunity doctrine, the Court has endeavored to create a pre-merits issue 
that would be legal only. Thus, the doctrine protects officials from monetary 
liability in those circumstances in which constitutional law is unsettled243 
and there is little doubt that what constitutes. settled law is itself a question of 
law.244 Since fourth amendment law is as settled as it is likely to get,245 one 
might have expected that all cases in this area would go to a jury on the 
"merits." Thus, the probable cause issue in Garner would be assumed to be 
appropriate for ajury.246 Instead the Court in Malley 247 converted that issue 
into one for the judge by measuring the real defendant's evidence and knowl-
edge against a mythical reasonable police officer in the circumstances. 248 The 
workability of this solution is in doubt.249 
As difficult as it might be to convert constitutional words and phrases into 
jury-triable standards of care for§ 1983 actions, let me introduce a word of 
skepticism about the alternative, choosing torts phrases to serve the same 
goals. Even if juries do not in fact understand torts talk, judges understand 
the impact of such phrases on juries at the margin of decisionmaking.250 I 
have tried to capture this idea by repeatedly referring to the use of such 
phrases to "reflect" constitutional norms. But it should also be recognized 
that these reflections produce a derivative and thus less certain version of 
241. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 323-25 (not open to plaintiffs to present witnesses who will second-
guess prison authorities on the need to restore order or best methods for it). 
242. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 236-38 (explaining scope of power of court to 
rule "as a matter of law" in negligence cases). 
243. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
244. This is because the question necessarily involves the question of what the Jaw is or was. See 
Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3038-40 (discussing meaning of phrase "clearly established" constitutional 
law). 
245. See id. at 3039 (principles of fourth amendment settled). 
246. See supra text accompanying note 146 (quoting Garner's constitutional standard). 
247. 475 u.s. 335 (1986). 
248. Id. at 343-44. 
249. In Anderson the Court adhered to its Malley decision, but it appeared to admit that Malley's 
attempt to decide the issues by motions to dismiss or for summary judgment-thus avoiding any 
appearance of jury-like factfinding-could not always work. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3040 (deci-
sion can be made only by knowing information available to defendant); id. at 3042 n.6 (discovery of 
facts may be necessary to make ruling). Of course, to the extent that factfinding is necessary, that 
development complicates the easy argument that this is purely a question of law and reduces the 
Court to holding that this is an issue of law only because the Court says so. 
250. See supra text accompanying note 223 (arguing that tort phrases give more predictable 
results). 
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constitutional adjudication than does judicial decisionmaking that directly 
invokes the constitutional norms.251 The subtlety of constitutional lawmak-
ing that open-ended constitutional norms now give to judges would be lost; 
there could be no steady course of decisions under a jury-enforced reflective 
test that could send a signal stronger than the underlying constitutional rules 
themselves. Worse still, the constitutional-law interest in having life-tenured 
judges protect minority rights would be diminished as decisionmaking under 
only reflective guidelines is handed to juries. Finally, there is the real fear 
that tort standards provide only the illusion of greater manageability with 
juries. In other constitutional contexts where they have been employed, some 
think that tort phrases "roll right past the jurors."252 
III. FROM STATE-OF-MIND TO STANDARDS OF CARE FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS-THE LIMITS OF TORTS TALK AND 
THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE DISEMBODIED STATE-OF-MIND REQUIREMENT 
For better or for worse, § 1983's creation of constitutional torts has 
changed constitutional interpretation. The inherent tension in covering both 
conduct illegal under state law and that consistent with state law, when 
joined with the need to charge juries in civil actions, has created problems 
affecting the very constitutional law that will be enforced in the § 1983 ac-
tion. The primary effect, as discussed in the preceding section, has been the 
creation of tort-like standards of care or the adaptation of constitutional tests 
to resemble tort-like standards. This development has, however, created an-
other problem: some courts, fascinated with state-of-mind phrases, have un-
fortunately viewed them as a panacea for some difficult issues, thus ducking 
the issue of prescribing the requisite objects of the state-of-mind, the duties 
imposed by constitutional law. These courts stop at a state-of-mind require-
ment when they should be fashioning a standard of care. 
251. Consider the parallel criticism that several commentators have directed at "categorical" 
decisionmaking in free-speech cases. They charge that the use of such categories as "fighting 
words," "commercial speech," and "child pornography" to exclude certain speech from ordinary 
constitutional protection is but a gross version of balancing that should probably be discarded in 
favor of more precise balancing in each case. See generally Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of 
Obscenity, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 1 (categorization versus balancing in obscenity analysis); Schauer, 
Codifying the First Amendment, 1982 SuP. Cr. REV. 285 (categorization examined through analysis 
of Supreme Court's categorization of child pornography as unprotected speech); Schauer, Catego-
ries and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981) (preference for 
categorical distinctions in first amendment analysis ignores theoretically significant differences but 
provides framework for incorporating free speech values into legal system). 
252. See Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 613 (1983) (commenting on "reckless 
disregard" standard read into constitutional law of libel). 
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The probl~m appears in several contexts. Most are related to liability for 
indirect harms, those not personally inflicted by government officials but 
originating elsewhere and not restrained by government. In Dollar, 253 for 
example, the parents of children killed by a natural flood sought to hold a 
county liable for failure to build a bridge that would have carried them above 
the waters. In Jackson v. City of Joliet 254 and Archie v. City of Racine 255 
estates sought to hold cities liable for the consequences of accidents or natu-
ral health problems in contexts in which city aid seemed appropriate.256 In 
Wood v. Ostrander257 a person harmed by a third party after government 
officials failed to render aid sought to impose liability on the officials.258 In 
Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers259 an estate sought to hold officials 
responsible for the decedent's self-inflicted death.260 A quite similar issue has 
arisen in some municipal liability cases in which plaintiffs seek to impose 
liability on government for the inadequacies of its personnel. In McKenna v. 
City of Memphis, 261 for exampler the plaintiff sought to hold the city liable 
for its employees' constitutional violations by alleging that the city had inad-
equately trained and supervised them.262 
In several of these cases, as well as others presenting similar problems,263 
courts appear to have chosen the quite similar "gross negligence, reckless-
ness, or 'deliberate indifference'" tests264 as their state-of-mind requirements, 
and have turned the cases back to juries on these "[t]riable issues of fact."265 
To the extent that these cases emphasize a state-of-mind requirement stand-
ing alone, and allow juries to decide without further guidance, their holdings 
253. 704 F.2d at 1540. For a fuller discussion of Dollar, see supra text accompanying notes 81-
82. 
254. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). 
255. 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
256. In Jackson, the police officer at the scene of an accident failed to ascertain whether a burn-
ing car was occupied before directing traffic from the area, thus preventing passersby from render-
ing aid. 715 F.2d at 1201-02. In Archie, the city provided emergency medical services via telephone 
that proved to be inadequate and misleading to the affected person; she died. 847 F.2d at 1213-14. 
257. 851 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1988). 
258. I d. at 13 (woman raped by man who gave her ride after police officer arrested her compan-
ion, had his car impounded, and left her on foot in high crime area). 
259. 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986). 
260. Id. at 1183. 
261. 785 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1986). 
262. ld. at 561. 
263. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1246 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) ("gross 
negligence"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) ("grossly negligent" 
or "deliberately indifferent"); Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 199-200 (6th 
Cir. 1987) ("gross negligence"); Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(gross negligence); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) ("gross negligence" or 
"reckless disregard"). 
264. Wood, 851 F.2d at 1214. 
265. Id. at 1219. 
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are inadequate. They are the same as saying that "intent" violates the equal 
protection clause, without fully noting that it is "intent to segregate based on 
race" that comprises the full constitutional standard of care. If this is an 
outright mistake, it was not a mistake made by these courts alone. 
B. THE FAILURE OF DANIELS AND DAVIDSON 
The Supreme Court faced similar sets of facts two years ago when it first 
overtly adopted its current approach of finding § 1983 standards of care in 
constitutional rather than common law norms. In the companion cases of 
Daniels v. Williams 266 and Davidson v. Cannon 267 the Court decided that 
neither the procedural nor substantive due process aspects of the fourteenth 
amendment made negligent official conduct actionable under § 1983. Taking 
a bold stand, the Court declared "that the Due Process Clause . . . is not 
implicated by the lack of due care"268 because "something more than negli-
gence"269 is required. In defining what that something more was, the Court 
hinted that only "deliberate decisions" give rise to a constitutional claim. 270 
There may be a good deal to recommend the Court's intuitive judgment 
that due process concerns were not implicated in the cases before it, a slip-
and-fall claim in Daniels, someone having left a pillow in the inmate's walk-
ing path, and a beating by fellow prisoners in Davidson. 271 But the Court's 
method of decision, letting a state-of-mind phrase carry the total burden of 
distinguishing constitutional wrongs, has nothing to recommend it. State-of-
mind tests are meaningless and manipulable without an articulation of the 
duties that the law imposes. 
That state-of-mind phrases alone could not serve the Court's goals should 
have been apparent to the Court based on observations it made in both cases. 
In Daniels the prisoner contended that a prior case involving loss of good-
time credits without a hearing had implicitly recognized that negligent fail-
ure to provide hearings is a procedural due process violation. The Court 
responded that the "relevant action of the prison officials in that situation is 
their deliberate decision to deprive the inmate of good-time credit, not their 
hypothetically negligent failure" to provide a hearing about the loss. 272 That 
266. 474 u.s. 327 (1986). 
267. 474 u.s. 344 (1986). 
268. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334. 
269. I d. The Court attributed this remark to the plaintiff, but acknowledged in text and footnote 
that it did not quarrel with the view and would not rule on the precise issue it raised. See id. at 334-
35 & n.3 (discounting plaintiff's argument that it would be difficult to determine precise standard if 
it is "something more than negligence"). 
270. See id. at 331 (noting that, historically, due process implicated only by such decisions); id. at 
333-34 (giving example of deliberate decision leading to liability). 
271. See supra notes 101-02 (summarizing facts of cases). 
272. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333-34. 
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statement is almost flatly at odds with the Court's holding in Carey v. 
Piphus, 273 which emphasized that the constitutional interest deserving of 
compensation in procedural due process cases is primarily the interest in a 
hearing, not the rightness of the hearing's outcome. The plaintiff, therefore, 
appears to have focused on the correct constitutional interest.274 Moreover, 
by changing the focus of the duty from the hearing to the good-time loss, the 
Court demonstrated that state-of-mind tests are easily manipulated unless 
they are tied to a particular duty.275 
The decision in Davidson illustrates the same flaw. Although it rejected the 
plaintiff's claim concerning failure to protect him from fellow prisoners, the 
Court cited with approval two cases which had imposed liability. In the first, 
guards themselves had unnecessarily beaten an inmate, 276 and in the other, 
guards stood by while prisoners beat a fellow inmate.277 There is no way to 
distinguish the latter of these two cases from Davidson on state-of-mind 
alone. The Court must also articulate the constitutionally imposed duty, 
possibly one to protect from harm prisoners in one's presence, but not pris-
oners outside one's presence. The dissenting opinion in Davidson faced this 
issue;278 the majority did not. 279 
The Court's failure in Daniels and Davidson to explore the range of consti-
tutional duties contrasts sharply with the Court's earlier opinion in Estelle, ·in 
which articulation of a duty to provide care for "serious medical needs" pro-
vides the focus for choosing the "deliberate indifference" standard.280 Shorn 
of a specific duty, deliberate indifference might be interpreted to release from 
liability a prison doctor who through mere inattentiveness-indeliberate in-
difference, not a "deliberate decision" to ignore his inmate patients-played 
more golf than he practiced medicine. But Estelle's specification of a duty, 
the affirmative duty to provide care for serious medical needs, provides a 
focus for the state-of-mind inquiry. The same could be said for several other 
well-reasoned Supreme Court decisions.2B1 
273. 435 u.s. 247 (1978). 
274. /d. at 266. 
275. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text (discussing same issue with respect to ordi-
nary torts and Court's intent cases). 
276. Davidson, 414 U.S. at 348 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). Johnson and its importance are discussed above. See supra notes 233-35 and 
accompanying text. 
277. Davidson, 414 U.S. at 348 (citing Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)). 
278. /d. at 350 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between dangers from which a prisoner 
could protect himself, such as a fall, and dangers from which only prison personnel could protect 
him, such as a fellow inmate's attack). 
279. /d. at 348 (majority opinion) (simply observing that as in slip-and-fall case only "lack of due 
care" was at issue in beating case). 
280. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 94, 104 (1976). 
281. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987) (intent unneces· 
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There are some arguments that could be made for a disembodied state-of-
mind requirement for due-process violations, even assuming that by "deliber-
ate decision" the Daniels Court meant to cover decisions made with "deliber-
ate indifference" or "recklessness."282 Most importantly, it would provide 
omnibus coverage, protecting all citizens from every kind of highly objection-
able mistreatment by state officials. But that virtue is also a vice. The test 
could produce a potential claim in every citizen for every supposed harm, an 
approach at odds with the traditional approach of imposing greater duties 
upon governmental officials only in the context of a limited number of highly 
protected fundamental rights. 283 
There are other arguments that also could be made for the practice, but 
their defects show the limitations inherent in letting tort phrases carry too 
much of the load of defining constitutional rights. First, the open-ended test 
might be conceived as a protection against arbitrariness, a recognition that 
current due-process doctrine prevents such governmental action. 284 Yet that 
protection has been created in the context of judicially declared constitu-
tional law in which judges appraise action with the substantial deference 
mandated by low-level scrutiny.285 To allow juries to make the arbitrariness 
decision, which they could do if courts did not restrict them by specifying 
constitutional duties, would tum our constitutional law on its head.286 Fi-
nally, it might be argued that this disembodied state-of-mind test would pro-
vide at least some protection against those excesses that failed some smell test 
and most upset society. However, this could lead not only to regional varia-
tions of the type lamented under the old Whirl approach to § 1983,287 but 
also to jury-to-jury variations depending on the sympathies of the parties and 
the values of the jurors. 288 Only some articulation of constitution-based du-
sary in free-speech case involving tax on magazines when it can be shown that tax varies by content 
of publications); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 579-80 (1984) (intent to punish pretrial de-
tainee, rather than intent to promote safety). 
282. Ct Wood, 851 F.2d at 1214 (construing Daniels to permit adoption of deliberate indifference 
or recklessness standard). 
283. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870-71 (1989) (rejecting "generic" due process). 
284. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331. 
285. See, e.g., Kelley v_,_Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1976) (hair length); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (employment restrictions); ct Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (since practicing homosexual sodomy is not fundamental right, 
regulation of the activity does not receive close scrutiny). 
286. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (life-tenured judges usually protect rights from 
majority pressure). 
287. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55 (discussing problems inherent in adopting state 
common law standards for § 1983 cases). 
288. Whatever may be said for Justice Rehnquist's observation that "many branches of the law 
abound in nice distinctions," Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334, the distinction between intent and gross 
negligence or "deliberate decisions" may be simply too psychologically crude to form the basis for 
constitutional law that jurors will apply. See Archie, 847 F.2d, at 1226 (en bane) (Posner, J., con-
curring) (doubtful of term's precision without articulation of duties). 
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ties can avoid these problems. 
C. THE TENTATIVE 1989 DECISIONS 
The Court returned to these issues in early 1989 and attempted to put 
some meat on the disembodied state-of-mind requirements that appeared to 
dominate the Daniels and Davidson cases. The two cases, DeShaney v. Win-
nebago County Department of Social Services 289 and City of Canton v. Har-
ris290 struck superficially discordant tones, DeShaney . emphasizing 
constitutional duties, while Canton continued to use torts phrases.291 
Although the cases cannot easily be reconciled, several similarities in the de-
cisions indicate that the Court is finally beginning to appreciate that identifi-
cation of constitutional duties is even more important than manufacturing 
state-of-mind requirements. 
The DeShaney case involved a child beaten so severely by his father that he 
was left brain-damaged for life, but the§ 1983 suit was brought not against 
the father but against county social workers who "fail[ed] to intervene to 
protect" the child. 292 The Court rejected the case on grounds that spoke 
pointedly in terms of constitutional duties. The fourteenth amendment, said 
the Court, "forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or 
property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be ex-
tended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those 
interests do not come to harm through other means. "293 Although the Court 
acknowledged that it had created exceptions for persons held involuntarily in 
state custody,294 it found these inapplicable because the child was in the cus-
tody of his father.295 Finally, sounding a long-standing theme, the Court 
pointedly noted that its decision was based on constitutionally supplied 
norms, not those relevant to the creation of state tort law.296 
289. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). 
290. 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). 
291. A third case, Brower v. Inyo County, 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989), is also of some importance. 
See infra note 309 and accompanying text (discussing Brower). 
292. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002. Over a period of two years the county social services agency 
intervened to protect the child on one occasion, but provided only sporadic follow-up supervision 
despite repeated documented evidence suggesting that the father repeated abused the child. Id. at 
1001-02. 
293. Id. at 1003. The Court also noted that there is "no affirmative right to governmental aid," 
id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (failure to provide funding for abortions 
not constitutional violation), and that as general matter, a "State is under no constitutional duty to 
provide substantive services," id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)) (services 
must be provided to involuntarily admitted mental patients, but not generally to others). 
294. 109 S. Ct. at 1005 (discussing cases involving prisoners and mental patients); cf. White v. 
Rockford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 n.6 (7th Cir. 1976) (special relationship created when officers arrest 
child's custodian and leave child unattended). 
295. 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06. 
296. Id. at 1006-07. 
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The Canton case seems similar, for it involved the alleged failure of city 
officials to provide adequate training to their police officers, training that 
would forestall harm visited upon detainees by untrained officers. Never cit-
ing DeShaney, the Court ruled that liability could be imposed on the city if 
its inaction "amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with 
whom the police come into contact."297 On its face the opinion appears not 
only to resort once again to disembodied state-of-mind requirements to iden-
tify constitutional norms, it also imposes affirmative duties in violation of 
DeShaney's admonition that officials are liable only for their own misdeeds. 
There are ways to distinguish DeShaney and Canton, but they satisfy only 
as well as fast food. Canton, one could argue, was a municipal liability case 
in which the Court appeared to understand that some officer had already 
committed a constitutional violation, and the sole remaining issue was who 
would pay.298 DeShaney, the argument goes, involved no extant violation 
since the offending father failed to qualify as a state actor.299 But the argu-
ment puts untenable pressure on the state-action distinction, for officers, even 
supervisors, are no more liable for the actions of fellow officers than they are 
for those of private persons. 300 A variant of this argument might emphasize 
that Canton concerns municipal, not personal liability, but that thesis runs 
afoul of the observation that the law of municipal immunity has grown di-
rectly from the law of supervisors' liability.301 A final mutation might press 
the position that municipal liability appears to depend on statutory, rather 
than constitutional, ascription of responsibility,302 but that argument fails to 
note that the same language covers all "person[s]," both real ones and 
municipalities. 303 
297. 109 S. Ct. 1197. 
298. See id. at 4272 (seeking "causal link between a municipal policy or custom, and the alleged 
constitutional deprivation"). Professor Schuck makes this assumption in his article on municipal 
liability that appears in this symposium. See generally Schuck, supra note 160. 
299. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (private person performing activity 
unconstitutional when done by public official does not become state actor when he acts as permitted 
by state law). 
300. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (supervisors not liable on respondeat superior 
theory for unconstitutional actions of underlings). 
301. Compare id. at 375-76 (no respondeat-superior-type liability for supervisors; causal link be-
tween supervisor's acts and underling's wrongs must be shown) (Rehnquist, J.) with City of 
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818-20 (1985) (plurality opinion ofRehnquist, 1.) (rejecting 
respondeat superior liability for municipalities and demanding "affirmative link") and id. at 828 
(Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (requiring similar linkage). See 
generally Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (summarizing municipal liability rules). 
302. See Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1203-05 & n.8 (no constitutional violation by city supervisors, only 
by line officer (citing City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (tying liability to statutory responsibility for "caus[ing]" constitutional deprivation))). 
303. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 688-89 (municipalities are "persons" under§ 1983); cf. Malley, 475 
U.S. at 344 n.7 (ruling that causation, in context of individual responsibility and intervening events, 
is measured by statutory and common-law, rather than constitutional, norms). 
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Although the Canton opinion appears dazed and confused at this intellec-
tual level, the rules actually announced in the case are a significant advance-
ment over the Court's earlier efforts in the Daniels and Davidson cases, for 
the Court carefully delineates the duties to which it ties the "deliberate indif-
ference" mental element. Indeed, the state-of-mind phrase seems virtually 
irrelevant: the Court maintains that the pertinent "issue ... is whether th[e] 
training program is adequate,"304 and proceeds to define quite narrowly the 
considerations that apply in making that determination. First, the Court 
adopts an obviousness test, imposing a duty to train when "the need for more 
or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in 
the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can 
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. " 305 Sec-
ond, the Court reinforces the program-level responsibility of city officials, 
opining that there is no duty to see that each officer is adequately trained.306 
Finally, the Court protects the municipality from speculative claims by re-
quiring that plaintiffs demonstrate that an identifiable failure to train "actu-
ally caused" or is "closely related" to the harm suffered.307 
Canton, therefore, is a far cry from prior cases that adopted a disembodied 
state-of-mind requirement: rather, it specifies the duties that a city poli-
cymaker must observe in order to avoid liability. To the extent that the 
DeShaney case also defines the perimeters of constitutional responsibility,308 
it likewise contributes to the accretion of a law of constitutional duties that 
serves the traditional purposes of constitutional law by having the Court, 
rather than juries acting pursuant to vague mental elements, define constitu-
tionallaw.309 
304. 109 S. Ct. at 1205. 
305. I d. The Court illustrated the idea in a footnote that states that failure to train police officers 
in the use of their firearms would be an obvious factor leading to violations of the rule of Gamer. 
Id. at 1205 n.10. The Court also adopted the view that a series of constitutional violations could 
put the city on notice that its training efforts were deficient, toleration of which would constitute a 
violation of§ 1983. Id. 
306. 109 S. Ct. at 1206. 
307. Id. 
308. See supra text accompanying notes 294-95 (distinguishing between custodial and non-custo-
-dial situations). In light of Davidson's holding that a jailor has no duty to protect from beatings 
prisoners who are outside his presence, see supra text accompanying notes 276-79, it appears that 
DeShaney's line will need further refinement. 
309.· In Brower, another related case decided in early 1989, the Court adopted an intent test for 
testing fourth amendment seizures. 109 S. Ct. at 1381 ("termination of movement through means 
intentionally applied" is a seizure; unintended restriction is not (emphasis in original)). Brower thus 
continues the trend of specifying constitutional standards of care not by adopting state-of-mind tests 
alone, by by specifying with some care the duty owed by the state actor. To the extent that the 
Court left open on remand the definition of constitutional unreasonableness, Brower also shows that 
the definition of constitutional duties may depend upon laying of several specified duties. Jd. at 
4323 (seizure found; demands of "reasonableness" under Garner open on remand). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In a marked clarification of its ruling in Monroe, the Supreme Court has 
recently held that§ 1983 has no state-of-mind requirement of its own, that it 
adopts the state-of-mind requirement of the constitutional right that the 
plaintiff seeks to enforce. This development not only rationalizes the law of 
§ 1983, it also reiterates the long-established distinction between constitu-
tional law and state common law. To the extent that this may make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to induce federal courts to judicial activism, it is a diffi-
culty grounded in a real appreciation for constitutional norms. 
Yet the movement to find§ 1983's standards in constitutional norms tends 
to obscure a subtler reality, that the very existence of§ 1983's authorization 
of suits for damages alters the ensuing constitutional law that the Court 
makes. Assumptions about § 1983 that date back to its original reinvigora-
tion, particularly its dual coverage of both official acts and official miscon-
duct as well as its reliance on juries for enforcement of damage claims, create 
dynamic influences that force constitutional law more in the direction of a 
torts-like vocabulary and method of analysis. I have argued that movement 
can be reconciled with constitutional tradition only if courts end their over-
reliance on disembodied state-of-mind requirements and begin to identify the 
more precise constitutional duties to which the mental elements attach. 
The fluid ideas identified in this Article are more currents than stagnant 
pools. The movement toward constitutionalizing standards of care contains 
an eddy that seeks to have some issues of causation turn on statutory rather 
than constitutional norms. Even more fundamentally, the rise of municipal 
liability is undermining Monroe's original model of individual responsibility 
and perhaps giving some impetus to a competing model of governmental re-
sponsibility, at least for the training of personnel. Grounded in constitu-
tional concerns, § 1983 has shown itself to be as changeable as the 
constitutional law it enforces. 
